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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd.,1 plaintiff Peter Lovenheim 
asked the D.C. District Court to enjoin defendant Iroquois Brands, Ltd. 
 
∗ This article is a reprint of the article that was printed in the Akron Law Review, Volume 44, Issue 
2, 2011. There was a printing error with this article and its corrections are included in this article. 
∗∗ Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law.  The Author is grateful to Peter Lovenheim and 
Ralph Halpern, for their willingness to help me reconstruct the background to this case, and also to 
my colleague, Rebecca Huss, who helped me to situate the case in two of its important contexts, the 
history of animal law and the corporate response to shareholder proposals. 
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(Iroquois) from omitting his shareholder proposal from the proxy 
materials sent out in advance of its 1985 annual shareholder meeting.2  
The proposal related to a French product, pâté de foie gras, which 
Iroquois distributed in the United States,3 and which constituted a tiny 
part of Iroquois’ business.4  Lovenheim, the owner of two hundred 
shares of Iroquois’ common stock,5 called upon Iroquois to investigate 
whether the French producer engaged in forced-feeding of the geese, 
which Lovenheim considered a form of animal cruelty, in producing the 
pâté de foie gras and, if that turned out to be the case, asked Iroquois to 
consider discontinuing the product until a more humane means of 
production could be developed.6 
He decided to submit a shareholder proposal as permitted under 
SEC rule 14a-8 (the Rule)7 promulgated pursuant to section 14(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ’34 Act).8  Those regulations 
provide that a corporation must include qualifying shareholder proposals 
in its proxy solicitation materials distributed in advance of annual or 
special shareholder meetings, along with the shareholder’s statement in 
support of the proposal.9  A shareholder proposal is any 
“recommendation or requirement that the company and/or its board of 
directors take action” that a shareholder intends to present at a 
shareholder meeting.10  The District Court granted Lovenheim’s motion 
and preliminarily enjoined Iroquois from sending out its proxy materials 
without the proposal.11 
Lovenheim is not only a standard teaching case in corporate law 
courses, it is routinely cited by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in response to corporations seeking to exclude shareholder 
proposals from proxy materials on the ground that the proposals are not 
 
 1. 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 2. Id. at 556. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See id. at 559 (finding that sales of the product accounted for none of Iroquois’ net 
earnings and less than 0.05% of its assets). 
 5. Id. at 556. 
 6. Id. 
 7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2010). 
 8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 895 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 78n(a) (West 2010)) (amended by PL 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010)). 
 9. Id.  At the time, the proposal, together with the statement in support, must be no more 
than 200 words in length.  Lovenheim, 618 F. Supp. at 557 n.4.  The current version of the rule 
allows shareholders 500 words to support their proposal.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (2010). 
 10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (2010). 
 11. Lovenheim, 618 F. Supp. at 562. 
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significantly related to the corporations’ businesses.12  Despite the case’s 
prominence, its story has not been told in detail.  That is a shame, 
because the details of the case are as surprising as its outcome must have 
been to Iroquois when the court granted Lovenheim the injunction he 
sought. 
The case seems like a setup.  At the time he invested in Iroquois, 
Lovenheim was the Government Relations Counsel for the Humane 
Society of the United States (Humane Society) in Washington, D.C.13  
Lovenheim had offered the same proposal at the 1983 shareholder 
meeting, at which time only about 5% of the voting shares supported it.14  
During oral argument, Lovenheim’s counsel conceded that Lovenheim 
had no expectation that the proposal would succeed.15  Lovenheim 
himself seems to be a front for the Humane Society, and his suit appears 
to be a political crusade masquerading as shareholder activism.16  That 
is, it seems like Lovenheim was in fact far more interested in stopping 
animal cruelty than he was in preserving the value of his investment in 
Iroquois stock.  After all, his proposal could not have succeeded.  Had it 
succeeded it only would have required the corporation to form a 
committee to investigate the process whereby one of its products was 
produced.  Lovenheim likely knew that no such investigation was 
necessary, since as far as he knew, pâté de foie gras was always 
produced through the brutal force-feeding of geese.17  And so the entire 
shareholder proposal process, even if successful, would have resulted in 
 
 12. A Westlaw search reveals that the case has been cited in five published cases and nearly 
150 SEC No-Action Letters. 
 13. Joyce Tischler, The History of Animal Law, Part I (1972-1987), 1 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & 
POL’Y 1, 40 (2008). 
 14. Memorandum of Law at 2-3, Iroquois Brands, Ltd., SEC File No. 1-5387 (Jan. 30, 1984) 
(on file with author) (submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of 
Corporation Finance appealing the Division’s decision regarding the Lovenheim Shareholder 
Proposal for Iroquois Brands, Ltd.). 
 15. Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 5, Lovenheim v. Iroquois 
Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-0734) (on file with the author) (statement of 
Lovenheim’s counsel:  “I will be the first to admit that in the 43 years of the shareholder proposal 
rule only two shareholder proposals have ever been passed, and they basically had management 
support.”). 
 16. One scholar claimed that Lovenheim’s petition had achieved “legendary proportions” as 
an example of the extent to which social issue proposals had become “trivial and nonsensical.”  
Marilyn B. Cane, The Revised SEC Shareholder Proxy Proposal System:  Attitudes, Results and 
Perspectives, 11 J. CORP. L. 57, 61 (1985). 
 17.  See Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 15, at 7-8 
(statement of Lovenheim’s counsel acknowledging that force-feeding is the only way pâté de foie 
gras is produced). 
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a report which would have confirmed what the shareholders already 
knew when they overwhelmingly rejected the same proposal in 1983. 
This Article is a Law Story.18  Law Stories have many purposes, but 
their main goal is to supplement and demystify the case method of legal 
pedagogy.19  The case method has been criticized for presenting students 
with the law more or less as a fait accompli.  The case method assumes a 
pre-existing body of law that students passively learn rather than 
learning to think of the law as something that they will have a hand in 
shaping.20  By placing the (mostly appellate) opinions that law students 
read in their various historical contexts, Law Stories transport students 
back to a point where the law was uncertain and thus enable them to 
better imagine alternatives to existing legal rules and to appreciate the 
reasoning underling those rules. 
Both Peter Lovenheim and Lovenheim,21 as well as the dynamic of 
shareholder proposals, turn out to be far more complicated than the 
opinion would lead one to expect, and that is why the case provides the 
basis for an especially rich Law Story.  First, although Peter Lovenheim 
looks, when we are first introduced to him, like a typical shareholder 
activist, who was much more interested in pushing a social agenda than 
in promoting good corporate governance, he is actually more like the 
ideal shareholder proponent.  He invested in Iroquois to make a profit, 
and he submitted his proposal because he sincerely believed that the 
distribution of pâté de foie gras was inconsistent with Iroquois’ 
 
 18. Many Law Stories are collected in Foundation Press’s LAW STORIES series.  A complete 
listing of the books in the series is provided on Foundation Press’s website:  West Academic, 
Faculty Online Store, 
http://www.westacademic.com/Professors/ProductSearchResults.aspx?tab=6&series=177&searchty
peasstring=ADVANCED-SEARCH (last visited Nov. 7, 2010). 
 19. See Paul L. Caron, Back to the Future:  Teaching Law through Law Stories, 71 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 405, 406 (2002) (making the “modest claim” that Law Stories can enrich classroom teaching 
through the case method).  In 2005, the JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION recognized the importance 
of the Law Stories approach by devoting a section of one of its issues to Teaching Law Stories.  See 
Leslie Bender, Teaching Torts Stories, 55 J. LEG. EDUC. 108 (2005) (book review); Nancy S. 
Marder, Teaching Civil Procedure Stories, 55 J. LEG. EDUC. 138 (2005) (book review); Ajay K. 
Mehorata, Teaching Tax Stories, 55 J. LEG. EDUC. 116 (2005) (book review); Thomas Ross, 
Teaching Constitutional Law Stories, 55 J. LEG. EDUC. 126 (2005) (book review); Laura S. 
Underkuffler, Teaching Property Stories, 55 J. LEG. EDUC. 152 (2005) (book review). 
 20. Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong With Langdell’s Method and What to Do About It, 60 
VAND. L. REV. 609, 649 (2007); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 
1 J. LEG. EDUC. 211, 212 (1948) (faulting the case method for providing solutions to the problems 
posed in advance and thus not encouraging students to develop their own powers of reasoning and 
problem-solving). 
 21. 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985). 
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corporate purposes and would do harm to the corporation’s reputation 
and thus to its good-will value. 
Second, although Lovenheim’s proposal did not get very many 
votes from his fellow shareholders, Lovenheim regarded the exercise as 
a success because soon after the shareholder vote, Iroquois decided to 
discontinue distribution of pâté de foie gras.  His success, or what he 
regarded as success, led Lovenheim to pursue other social goals through 
the shareholder proposal mechanism.  His experience as a proponent led 
him to work with other like-minded shareholders on issues relevant to 
the corporations whose shares they owned.  The shareholder proposal 
mechanism thus stimulates shareholder involvement in corporate 
governance.  The story behind Lovenheim thus illustrates the numerous 
legal and non-legal consequences of a legal rule. 
In Part II, this Article explores the law of shareholder proposals and 
the reasons why the SEC and the courts permit proposals relating to 
social or ethical issues (social proposals) so long as those issues relate to 
the corporation’s business.  The focus here is on the regulation of such 
social proposals.  Other regulations permitting the exclusion of 
shareholder proposals will be discussed only to the extent that they 
interact with the Rule relating to social proposals.  Part III presents the 
complete narrative of the Lovenheim case, providing details that are not 
captured in the decision or in the limited secondary literature relating to 
the case.  Part IV explores the legal landscape in the aftermath of 
Lovenheim.  The decision may well have been a surprising one, and this 
final section explores the reasons why the decision remains the leading 
case on social proposals. 
As discussed in Part IV of the Article, opinions on the value of 
social proposals hinge on opinions on the purposes of corporations and 
the roles of shareholders in the corporations in which they own shares.  
Corporations seem to recognize the value of permitting social proposals, 
as they can provide a relatively inexpensive safety valve for dissent22 
and thus permit the kind of beneficial exchange between management 
and shareholders that promotes the legitimacy of corporate 
decisionmaking processes.  While corporations might regard these 
benefits as slight, the expense of social proposals is also very small.  
Corporations thus have little reason to appear to be attempting to 
obstruct one avenue of meaningful dialogue between management and 
 
 22. Donald E. Schwartz & Elliott J. Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal 
Rule, 65 GEO. L.J. 635, 635 (1977); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy 
Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1494 (1970). 
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shareholders when the traffic along that avenue relieves stress from the 
system and thus helps guarantee that the main arteries of commerce will 
not be blocked. 
II.  HISTORY OF SEC IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 14(A) OF THE 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
One might reasonably ask why we permit shareholder proposals in 
the first place.  After all, it is a fundamental premise of corporate 
governance that managers manage.23  Shareholders may be the beneficial 
owners of the corporation, but the separation of ownership and control is 
one of the key advantages of the corporate form.24  Although shareholder 
activism has always been one of the ingredients of U.S. corporate 
governance,25 Congress had acted in the early twentieth century to limit 
the ability of financial institutions to participate in corporate affairs.26  
However, in response to its perception that corporate management was 
abusing the proxy solicitation process,27 Congress granted the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (the SEC) broad power to regulate proxy 
solicitations in section 14(a) of the ’34 Act,28 and the current form of 
 
 23. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2010) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors . . . ); Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1994) 
(“Under normal circumstances, neither the courts nor the stockholders should interfere with the 
managerial decisions of the directors.”); Brooks v. Standard Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 810, 814 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (citing general corporate principles granting broad discretion to corporate 
management in permitting Standard Oil to exclude a shareholder proposal related to fostering the 
development of petroleum reserves and working to create an international regime to manage the 
exploitation of mineral resources). 
 24. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 7 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that 
centralized administration is a necessity in a large corporation and that shareholders as such do not 
participate in the day-to-day management of the corporations); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. 
Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & Econ. 301, 301-02 (1983) (arguing that 
“separation of decision and risk-bearing functions survives . . . in part because of the benefits of 
specialization of management and risk bearing but also because of an effective common approach to 
controlling the agency problems caused by separation of decision and risk-bearing functions.”). 
 25. See Stuart L. Gillian & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the 
United States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 55 (2007) (noting the role of financial institutions as 
shareholder activists in the early 20th century). 
 26. See id. (citing the Glass Steagall Act as well as regulatory reforms that followed the 1929 
stock market crash, which had the cumulative effect of widening the gap between ownership and 
control in U.S. public corporations). 
 27. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 22, at 636 (claiming that, prior to 1934, management 
was soliciting proxies without informing shareholders of the matters to be considered at the annual 
shareholder meeting and then using the favorable proxies thus obtained to control the meeting and 
for other questionable purposes). 
 28. Section 14(a) of the’34 Act provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or 
11- TELMAN_MACRO FINAL.DOCM 2/24/2012  9:59 AM 
2012] IS THE QUEST FOR CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY A WILD GOOSE CHASE? 297 
shareholder activism is a product of an SEC rule first introduced in 
1942,29 the predecessor to the current Rule.30  The Rule requires 
management to include in its proxy materials, sent out in advance of 
annual shareholder meetings, shareholder proposals to be voted on at 
those meetings so long as the shareholder meets certain conditions to 
qualify as a proponent.31 
Since section 14(a) simply prohibits deceptive practices in the 
solicitation of proxies, it is not obvious that the Rule implements the 
congressional legislation.32  The SEC interpreted section 14(a) as 
insuring fair corporate suffrage and “shareholders who were enlightened 
not only as to the financial condition of the corporation, but also as to 
the major questions of policy, which are decided at stockholders’ 
meetings.”33  In order to ensure that proxy materials accurately reflected 
all issues that would arise at an annual meeting, the SEC interpreted its 
own rules to permit shareholders to present proposals at annual 
meetings.34  As one court put it, “[C]orporate circulation of proxy 
materials which fail to make reference to a shareholder’s intention to 
present a proper proposal at the annual meeting renders the solicitation 
inherently misleading.”35  Others have pointed out that these rules were 
 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange 
or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or 
authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered 
pursuant to [section 12 of the ’34 Act]. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 895 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
78n(a) (West 2010)) (amended by PL 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010)). 
 29. The Rule was first designated Rule X-14A-7.  Duty of Management to Set Forth 
Stockholders’ Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942). 
 30. Gillian & Starks, supra note 25, at 55. 
 31. In its current version, the Rule requires that shareholders hold a minimum of $2,000 worth 
of shares in the corporation or more than 1% of the corporation’s outstanding shares and hold those 
shares for a minimum of one year prior to making the proposal.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1) 
(2010). 
 32. See George W. Dent, SEC Rule 14a-8:  A Study in Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1985) (noting that neither the text nor the legislative history of section 14(a) mentions 
shareholder proposals); Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 
18 GA. L. REV. 425, 465-66 (1984) (arguing that the Rule is hardly likely to achieve Congressional 
intent to assure fair corporate suffrage). 
 33. Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 
877, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 34. Id. 
 35. N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Am. Brands, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
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necessary in any case to safeguard the rights of shareholders recognized 
under state law.36 
A. Implementation of the Rule 1942-1970 
In enacting section 14 of the ’34 Act, Congress responded to an 
unpleasant by-product of the separation of ownership and control in the 
structure of corporations.  “[A]s management became divorced from 
ownership and came under the control of banking groups, men forgot 
that they were dealing with the savings of men and the making of profits 
became an impersonal thing.”37  Congress chose to regulate corporate 
proxies as one mechanism for preventing management from 
circumventing “fair corporate suffrage.”38 
1. Overview of SEC Regulation of Social Proposals 
The SEC’s initial regulatory efforts in this area were directed at 
promoting “full and fair corporate disclosure regarding management 
proxy materials.”39  In 1942, the SEC took the logical next step by 
adopting a rule that required management to include in its proxy 
materials shareholder proposals that constituted a “proper subject for 
action by security holders.”40  This seemed to offer shareholders an 
extensive right to provide their input to management, but the SEC 
immediately saw the danger that shareholders would use the proposal 
mechanism to raise matters that bore little relationship to company’s 
affairs.  In 1945, the Commission issued a release opining that 
“proposals which deal with general political, social or economic 
matters” are not proper subjects for shareholder action.41 
 
 36. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (mandating an annual shareholder meeting at 
which “any other proper business may be transacted”); see also Milton V. Freeman, An Estimate of 
the Practical Consequences of the Stockholder’s Proposal Rule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 549, 549 (1957) 
(calling fundamental aspects of Rule 14a-8 “an almost necessary consequence of the status of the 
individual shareholder under the laws of the various states of incorporation”).  Freeman served in 
the SEC’s General Counsel Office from 1934-42 and as its Assistant Solicitor from 1942-46.  Id. at 
549  n.*. 
 37. Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 73-1383, at 13 (1934)). 
 38. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 13 (1934)). 
 39. Id. at 677 (citing 3 Fed. Reg. 1991 (1938); 5 Fed. Reg. 174 (1940)). 
 40. Duty of Management to Set Forth Stockholders’ Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 
3347, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942). 
 41. Exchange Act Release No. 3638, 1945 WL 27415 (Jan. 3, 1945) (interpretation of Rule X-
14A-7). 
11- TELMAN_MACRO FINAL.DOCM 2/24/2012  9:59 AM 
2012] IS THE QUEST FOR CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY A WILD GOOSE CHASE? 299 
Between 1943 and 1970, shareholders submitted proposals on a 
variety of issues, but the main focus of shareholder activism in the years 
between World War II and the Vietnam War was corporate 
governance.42  Shareholders sought accountability from boards and 
management and improved performance that would increase the value of 
their shares.43  There arose in the 1940s the phenomenon of the “gadfly 
investor.”  Three such investors, Lewis and John Gilbert44 and Evelyn 
Davis, still accounted for 30% of the resolutions submitted to 
corporations as late as 1982.45  Their prominence among proponents led 
to cries that the process was being abused by people who were not 
interested in the economic well-being of the corporation but by people 
promoting “crackpot” ideas or “afflicted with an insatiate desire for 
personal publicity.”46 
The SEC’s approach to shareholder proposals has tended to mirror 
the times.  As one commentator put it, in the 1950s, the SEC “added 
layers of conditions to the rule and gutted meaningful shareholder 
access.”47  The SEC relaxed its restrictions during the Vietnam and 
Watergate eras before again seeking to “squelch access” during the more 
conservative 1980s.48  In 1984, the SEC granted no-action letters to 78% 
of the corporations that requested them.49  The trend towards a restrictive 
reading of shareholder rights continued into the next decade.  By the 
mid-1990s, the SEC was 30% more likely to permit the exclusion of 
proposals relating to corporations’ social responsibilities than it had been 
in the 1980s.50 
 
 42. See Gillian and Starks, supra note 25, at 56 (finding that, as late as 1978, 611 of 790 
proposals received by member companies of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries dealt 
with governance issues). 
 43. Id. (characterizing the first three decades of shareholder proposals as “aimed at improving 
performance and raising share values”). 
 44. Lewis Gilbert had been called the “most celebrated minority stockholder.”  LOUIS LOSS, 2 
SECURITIES REGULATIONS 903 n.182 (2d ed. 1961).  His main concerns were undeclared dividends 
and the installation of accounting and monitoring devices to improve directors’ accountability to 
shareholders. Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate 
Democracy 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 117 n.77 (1988).  He and his brother accounted for nearly half the 
shareholder proposals offered from 1948-1951 and for nearly 2/3 of the proposals offered in 1955.  
Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule:  A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 
ALA. L. REV. 879, 897 n.74 (1994). 
 45. Gillian and Starks, supra note 25, at 56. 
 46. See Arthur D. Chilgren, A Plea for Relief from Proxy Rule 14a-8, 19 BUS. LAW. 303, 303-
04 (1963) (finding it inconceivable that the majority of shareholder proposals “result from stock 
purchases made with any serious investment intent.”). 
 47. Palmiter, supra note 44, at 879-80. 
 48. Id. at 880. 
 49. Cane, supra note 16, at 60. 
 50. Palmiter, supra note 44, at 882, 913. 
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2. The Rule in the Courts 
The first significant court case testing shareholders’ ability to 
challenge management on issues of corporate governance through the 
mechanism of the shareholder proposal came in SEC v. Transamerica 
Corp.51  The main issue in the case was the scope of the “proper subject” 
for shareholder action referenced in the Rule.52  Transamerica argued 
that shareholder proposals must relate to a subject matter on which 
shareholders were permitted to vote under all legal requirements, 
including those found in the corporation’s charter and by-laws.53  The 
SEC took the broader position permitting proposals on any subject 
matter in which a shareholder had an interest under state law.54 
The court sided with the SEC, stressing that Transamerica’s reading 
of the Rule would circumvent Congress’ intent “to require fair 
opportunity for the operation of corporate suffrage.”55  Because a 
corporation must be run for the benefit of its stockholders and not for 
that of its managers,56 management could not be permitted to place 
technical provisions of a corporation’s charter or by-laws beyond the 
reach of the shareholder vote.  “The control of great corporations by a 
very few persons was the abuse at which Congress struck in enacting 
section 14(a).”57 
Although it supported shareholder rights in the Transamerica case, 
between 1948 and 1954, the SEC repeatedly revised the Rule to limit the 
ability of shareholders to make proposals.  In 1948, the SEC permitted 
corporations to exclude from their proxy statements proposals relating to 
personal grievances and proposals submitted by shareholders who did 
not attend the annual meeting, either in person or by proxy.58  In 1952, 
the SEC made a further attempt to prevent shareholder proposals from 
becoming a forum for the airing of political grievances, permitting 
corporate managers to exclude proposals submitted “primarily for the 
purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, 
social or similar causes.”59  The propriety of this regulation was not 
 
 51. 163 F.2d 511 (3d. Cir. 1947). 
 52. Id. at 515. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 518. 
 56. Id. at 517. 
 57. Id. at 518. 
 58. Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4185, 1948 WL 
28695 (Nov. 5, 1948). 
 59. Amendment to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4475, 1952 WL 5254 (Dec. 11, 
1952). 
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tested for nearly two decades.60  The SEC again expanded the 
permissible grounds for exclusion in 1954, permitting corporate 
management to exclude proposals relating to “ordinary business 
operations,” proposals that would violate state law and resubmitted 
proposals that had recently been overwhelmingly rejected.61 
Like these SEC revisions to the Rule, the case law in the two 
decades following the Transamerica62 decision was decidedly favorable 
to the discretion of both corporate management and the SEC, both of 
which inclined towards excluding proposals, especially social proposals.  
For example, in Peck v. Greyhound Corp.,63 shareholder Peck brought a 
proposal calling on the corporation to abolish its segregated seating 
system in the South.64  Greyhound sought to exclude the proposal and 
relied on the 1945 SEC release cited earlier,65 stating that it was not the 
intent of the Rule “to permit stockholders to obtain the consensus of 
other stockholders with respect to matters which are of a general 
political, social or economic nature.”66  The SEC staff agreed with the 
corporation’s assessment of the propriety of the proposal, finding that it 
was not on a “proper subject.”67  The Peck court did not go so far as to 
endorse Greyhound’s interpretation of the 1945 SEC Release.68  
However, the court denied Peck’s motion to enjoin Greyhound from 
soliciting proxies and holding its shareholder meeting unless Peck’s 
proposal was included in Greyhound’s proxy materials, finding that Peck 
had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.69  The court 
believed that Peck must first pursue SEC review of its staff’s no-action 
letter before seeking the injunction.70  In addition, the court noted that 
considerable deference was due to the SEC’s interpretation of its own 
 
 60. See Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“So far 
as we have been able to determine, the Commission’s interpretation or application of this rule has 
not been considered by the courts.”). 
 61. Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4979, 1954 WL 
5772 (Jan. 6, 1954). 
 62. 163 F.2d 511 (3d. Cir. 1947). 
 63. 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
 64. Id. at 680. 
 65. See Exchange Act Release No. 3638, supra note 41. 
 66. Peck, 97 F. Supp. at 680 (citing Exchange Act Release No. 3638, supra note 41). 
 67. Id. at 680. 
 68. Id. at 681. 
 69. Id. at 680-81. 
 70. Id. at 681. 
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rules and also found that Peck could not establish that he would be 
irreparably harmed if his injunction were denied.71 
The trend towards deference to SEC decisions continued in Dyer v. 
SEC,72 which raised the same kinds of corporate governance issues that 
the Third Circuit had found a proper subject for shareholder proposals in 
Transamerica.73  In Dyer, plaintiffs sought to force management of the 
Union Electric Company to include in its proxy materials eleven 
resolutions, by-law amendments, and amendments to the articles of 
incorporation.74  Some of the proposals had been the subject of a 
previous suit; others had been submitted and overwhelmingly rejected 
by shareholders in recent shareholder meetings.75  The Dyer court 
recognized the Transamerica decision as one with which it needed to 
come to terms.  However, it found the two cases easily distinguishable.  
In Transamerica, the SEC had supported inclusion of the proposals, and 
doing so was in accordance with Delaware law.76  In Dyer, by contrast, 
the SEC supported the corporation’s decision to exclude the proposals.77  
In addition, the court characterized as “almost fanciful” petitioners’ 
argument that the SEC was without rational basis to exclude their 
proposals, which were inconsistent with Missouri law, when 
management had agreed to the inclusion of a substantively similar 
proposal that was properly submitted under Missouri law.78 
While there seems little doubt that the Dyer court reached the right 
conclusions with respect to the proposals at issue in that case, the 
opinion is significant in the deferential language it adopted with respect 
to determinations of the SEC staff.79  The court took the lack of case law 
challenging SEC determinations on shareholder proposals as evidence 
 
 71. Id.  The proposal may have been excludable in any case because it would have put the 
company in violation of state laws then assumed to be valid.  See Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. 
SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 72. 289 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1961). 
 73. 163 F.2d 511 (3d. Cir. 1947). 
 74. Dyer, 289 F.2d at 243. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 246. 
 77. Id. at 423. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Daniel E. Lazaroff, Promoting Corporate Democracy and Social Responsibility:  The 
Need to Reform the Federal Proxy Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 50 RUTGERS. L. REV. 33, 50 
(1997) (finding a deferential posture in the court’s reference to a “lack of reported decisions” 
relating to shareholder proposals as evidencing general acceptance of the SEC’s regulatory 
judgments in the area). 
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that courts and shareholders alike were willing to accept such 
determinations as within the province of the SEC.80 
Deference to management and the SEC characterized decisions in 
this area into the late 1960s, when the courts dealt another blow to 
shareholder activism in Brooks v. Standard Oil Co.81  In that case, 
plaintiff offered a resolution that called on Standard Oil to intensify its 
effort to encourage exploration of the world’s continental shelves for oil 
reserves and to encourage the creation of an international regime over 
undersea mineral resources.82  Standard Oil notified the SEC that it 
intended to exclude the proposal, asserting that the proposal could be 
omitted because it:  (1) was not on a proper subject for shareholder 
action; (2) related to ordinary business matters; and (3) primarily sought 
to promote a general economic or political cause.83  Plaintiff, an attorney 
with expertise in the utilization of underwater mineral resources beyond 
national jurisdiction,84 sought a declaratory judgment that his resolution 
was on a proper subject for action by shareholders.85 
The SEC issued Standard Oil a no-action letter on the ground that 
the proposal was not a proper subject for action by shareholders.86  In so 
doing, the SEC clearly violated its own rules.87  The Rule required that, 
if the corporation claimed a legal ground for the omission of a 
shareholder proposal, the corporation must include a “supporting 
opinion of counsel” with its notice of intention to omit.88  Since Standard 
Oil provided no such opinion of counsel, it could not possibly have met 
its burden of production.89  However, the court concluded that plaintiff 
was not harmed by the SEC’s failure to adhere to its own procedural 
requirements, as Standard Oil’s opinion of counsel would have relied on 
the same legal arguments as Standard Oil presented in the court case.90  
Moreover, citing an earlier ruling in the Dyer91 litigation, the court 
 
 80. See Dyer, 289 F.2d at 245 (“Presumably, from the lack of reported decisions, the denials 
of attempts by stockholders in other public holding company situations to have inclusions made in 
management’s proxy material must generally have had their end in an acceptance of the regulatory 
judgment which the Commission has exercised in the particular situation.”). 
 81. 308 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
 82. Id. at 811. 
 83. Id. at 811-12 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1), (2), (5)). 
 84. Id. at 811. 
 85. Id. at 810. 
 86. Id. at 812. 
 87. Id. at 813 (citing Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, supra note 61). 
 88. Id. at 811 n.2 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d)). 
 89. Id. at 811 n.2. 
 90. Id. 
 91. 289 F.2d 242. 
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adopted a highly deferential approach to review of SEC no-action letters, 
accepting the SEC’s judgment “unless it can be said that what has been 
done is without any rational basis on all the elements involved.”92 
The only issue for the court to resolve then was whether the SEC 
had correctly construed New Jersey law relating to the relative powers of 
corporate management and shareholders.  The parties agreed that there 
was no New Jersey authority for whether or not plaintiff’s proposal was 
a proper subject for shareholder action.93  However, the court cited both 
New Jersey law and the Standard Oil by-laws, which both provided in 
nearly identical language that “the business and affairs of [the] 
corporation shall be managed by its board.”94  The court further relied on 
case law to extend something like the business judgment rule95 to the 
shareholder proposal context as well.  The court cited two opinions of 
New Jersey’s Chancery Court, one from 1891 and one from 1942.  The 
first stated that “[q]uestions of policy of management . . . are left solely 
to the honest decision of the directors, if their powers are without 
limitation and free from restraint.”96  In the later case, the Chancery 
Court cited the “well-settled rule of law that questions of business policy 
devolve upon the officers and directors. . . .”97  The court noted that most 
of the proposals that had been approved concerned matters relating to 
the selection, retention, and accountability of officers and directors98 and 
appeared to treat that fact as evidence that corporations were only 
required to include such proposals in their proxy materials. 
Thus, three decades after the SEC first adopted the Rule, the scope 
of the right of shareholders to bring proposals at annual meetings was 
 
 92. Brooks v. Standard Oil, Co., 308 F. Supp. 810, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (citing Dyer, 266 
F.2d at 38).  The court also relied on Peck to support its deference to the SEC’s construction of its 
own rules.  Id. at 813 (citing Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp 679, 681 S.D.N.Y. 1951)). 
 93. Id. at 814. 
 94. Id. 
 95. The Delaware Supreme Court defines the business judgment rule as “a presumption that 
in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.  Absent 
an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 
805, 812 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1984) (citations omitted), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 
Sup. Ct. 2000).  See D. A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure and Executive 
Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 833-38 (2007) (noting that the business judgment rule has 
been variously understood as a presumption, a heightened standard of review and a doctrine of 
judicial abstention). 
 96. Brooks, 308 F. Supp at 814 (citing Ellerman v. Chi. Junction Ry. Co., 23 A. 287, 292 (N.J. 
Ch. 1891)). 
 97. Id. (citing Laredef Corp. v. Fed. Seaboard Terra Cotta Corp., 25 A.2d 433, 437 (N.J. Ch. 
1942)). 
 98. Id. 
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narrowly circumscribed in two ways.  First, the SEC was granting no-
action letters with respect to all proposals except those relating to 
selection, compensation, and accountability of managers.  Second, the 
courts had adopted a highly deferential approach to SEC decisions, even 
if those decisions were taken at the staff level.  This trend was to change 
dramatically with the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Medical Committee for 
Human Rights v. SEC.99 
B. The Medical Committee Opinion 
The Medical Committee for Human Rights (Medical Committee) 
obtained, by gift, shares in the Dow Chemical Company (Dow).100  On 
March 11, 1968, the Medical Committee’s national chairman, Dr. 
Quentin Young, wrote to Dow and enclosed a first version of the 
Medical Committee’s shareholder proposal.101  The proposal requested 
the Board of Directors to amend Dow’s certificate of incorporation to 
provide “that napalm102 shall not be sold to any buyer unless that buyer 
gives reasonable assurances that the substance will not be used on or 
against human beings.”103  In the accompanying letter, Dr. Young 
conceded that its primary motivation was the Medical Committee’s 
concerns for human life, but he also noted that the Medical Committee’s 
investment advisers suggested that napalm production “is also bad for 
our company’s business as it is being used in the Vietnamese War” in 
part because it was making it “increasingly hard to recruit the highly 
intelligent, well-motivated, young college men so important for 
company growth.”104  In addition, the letter noted that the impact on the 
company for its decision to manufacture napalm was global.105 
Dr. Young’s language, espousing an economic interest in the 
corporation, was necessary to overcome language in the Rule that 
permitted a corporation to exclude a proposal “if it clearly appears that 
the proposal is submitted . . . primarily for the purpose of promoting 
general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes.”106  
 
 99. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 100. Id. at 661. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  Napalm is an aluminum-based soap, which is combined with gasoline to form a syrup 
used in chemical warfare.  Id.  It was developed by Harvard University scientists during World War 
II in order to increase the range of flamethrowers while also greatly increasing the temperature at 
which the fuel in such flamethrowers burned.  Id. at 661 n.1. 
 103. Id. at 662. 
 104. Med. Comm., 432 F.2d at 662. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 676 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1970)). 
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Still, the original proposal was susceptible to exclusion under another 
regulation that permitted omission of proposals seeking management 
action “with respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary 
business operations of the issuer.”107 
The Medical Committee had submitted the 1968 version of its 
proposal after the deadline for submitting such proposals and Dow, not 
surprisingly, refused to include it in its proxy statement.108  In January 
1969, having received no further communications from Dow, the 
Medical Committee re-submitted its proposal.109  After Dow notified the 
Medical Committee that it intended to omit the proposal from its proxy 
statement, the Medical Committee sought to revise the proposal.110  
Acknowledging that “management should be allowed to decide to whom 
and under what circumstances it will sell its products,” the Medical 
Committee nonetheless urged that “the company’s owners have not only 
the legal power but also the historic and economic obligation to 
determine what products their company will manufacture.”111  
Accordingly, the Medical Committee enclosed a revised proposal 
requesting that the Board “consider the advisability of adopting a 
resolution setting forth an amendment to [Dow’s certificate of 
incorporation] that the company shall not make napalm.”112 
Dow was unmoved by the amendments and sent the SEC a 
memorandum stating its reasons for omitting the proposal.113  The SEC 
Division of Corporation Finance granted a no-action letter.114  The 
Medical Committee duly appealed, but the full Commission approved 
the recommendation of its Division of Corporation Finance.115  The 
Medical Committee next appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit.116 
Given the case law since Transamerica,117 it was not entirely clear 
that the federal courts had jurisdiction to review SEC decisions relating 
to shareholder proposals, or that such review should occur in the Court 
 
 107. Id. at 679 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5) (1970)). 
 108. Id. at 662. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 663. 
 111. Id. at 662. 
 112. Id. at 663. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. 163 F.2d 511 (3d. Cir. 1947). 
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of Appeals.118  As the court noted,119 after the Southern District of New 
York’s ruling in Peck that a shareholder must exhaust administrative 
remedies through appeal to the Commission itself before seeking review 
in a federal court,120 shareholders would have faced quite a procedural 
conundrum if the D.C. Circuit had now ruled that exhaustion of 
administrative remedies barred a shareholder from review in a federal 
court.  However, the D.C. Circuit also recognized that there was some 
dicta and some scholarly comment suggesting that no-action letters in 
the shareholder proposal context were not reviewable orders.121  Still, 
after an extended discussion,122 the D.C. Circuit concluded that the SEC 
determination was reviewable123 in the Court of Appeals.124 
Having failed to persuade the Court of Appeals that it was without 
jurisdiction to review SEC decisions in such matters, the SEC 
nonetheless argued for a level of judicial deference to the SEC’s views 
akin to that accorded to prosecutorial discretion.125  The court did not 
feel the need to accord the SEC such deference, in large part because of 
evidence of frequent procedural irregularities in the SEC’s internal 
review of shareholder proposals.126  The most serious charge, the court 
noted, was 
all too clearly illustrated by the record in the present case:  the lack of 
articulated bases for past decisions encourages management to file 
shotgun objections to a shareholder proposal, urging every mildly 
 
 118. See Med. Comm., 432 F.2d at 665 (noting that the most difficult issues in the case arise 
from Dow’s and the SEC’s claim that the SEC decision is not a reviewable order under section 
25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act); id. at 672 (noting that “the essential question . . . is whether 
the district court is a more appropriate forum for adjudication of petitioner’s claim than” the Court 
of Appeals). 
 119. Id. at 667 n.9. 
 120. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Med. Comm., 432 F.2d at 666 n.5 (citing dictum from Klastorin v. Roth, 353 F.2d 
182, 183 n.2 (2d Cir. 1965) and one article from a practitioners’ publication but no holding on 
point).  Subsequent to the Medical Committee case, two Circuit Courts adopted the position that 
SEC no-action letters are not reviewable orders.  See Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers 
Union v. SEC, 15 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that the proper course of action if a 
shareholder believes that a corporation has improperly refused to include a proposal is to seek 
judicial review of the propriety of that action in a district court); Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641, 
645-46 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dismissing action for want of jurisdiction and distinguishing Medical 
Committee on the ground that in that case the Commission had reviewed and affirmed the staff no-
action recommendation and in the current case the Commission had refused comment on staff 
action). 
 122. Med. Comm., 432 F.2d at 665-72. 
 123. Id. at 672. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 673. 
 126. Id. at 674. 
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plausible legal argument that inventive counsel can contrive, in the 
hope that the Commission will accept one of them.127 
The Court inferred that the effect of SEC “discretion” was to 
dispose of controversies through “calculated non-decisions that will 
eventually cause eager supplicants to give up in frustration and stop 
‘bothering’ the agency.”128  The court then proceeded with a limited 
review of the SEC’s determination:  “if the Commission was found to 
have proceeded on erroneous legal principles, the Commission would be 
ordered to proceed within the framework of its own discretionary 
authority on the indicated correct principles.”129  Although the Court 
deemed it “obvious to the point of banality to restate” Congress’ purpose 
in enacting section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it 
nonetheless noted that Congress’ intent was “to give true vitality to the 
concept of corporate democracy.”130  That purpose could not possibly be 
frustrated by a remand to the SEC to articulate the grounds underlying 
the grant of its no-action letter. 
The court then proceeded to a discussion of the merits of the case.  
As indicated above, Dow sought to exclude the Medical Committee’s 
proposal on two grounds:  that its concerns were essentially political 
rather than economic and that it related to ordinary business 
operations.131  The court conceded that these two limitations on the 
corporation’s obligation to include shareholder proposals in its proxy 
materials were “on their face, consistent with the legislative purpose 
underlying section 14.”132  The court deemed it “fair to infer” that 
Congress would not have desired that proxy solicitations become a 
vehicle through which “malcontented shareholders [could] vent their 
spleen about irrelevant matters.”133  Congress may well also have 
anticipated that “management cannot exercise its specialized talents 
effectively if corporate investors assert the power to dictate the minutiae 
of daily business decisions.”134 
Still, in language that indicated a radical shift from earlier case law, 
the court acknowledged the risk that the two exclusions could be 
construed so as to exclude almost any shareholder proposal on the 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 675. 
 130. Id. at 676. 
 131. Id. at 665-72. 
 132. Id. at 678. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 679. 
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ground it is either too general or too specific.135  The court found that 
Dow had attempted to either dash the Medical Committee’s proposal 
against the Scylla of generality or to drown it in the Charybdis of 
specificity and that the SEC had accepted Dow’s decision to exclude the 
proposal without even identifying which of these hazards had provided 
the substantive ground for its decision.136 
With respect to the claim that the Medical Committee’s proposal 
was “too specific,” in that it related to Dow’s ordinary business 
operations and was thus excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(5), the court 
remarked that the scope of ordinary business operations was to be 
determined based on governing state law.137  However, Delaware law 
permits amendments to a corporation’s certificate of incorporation so as 
to “change, substitute, enlarge or diminish the nature of the” 
corporation’s business.138  The court found no evidence in the record to 
support Dow’s contention that the proposal was not for a proper purpose 
under Delaware law.139  Departing from the reasoning of the Brooks 
court,140 the Medical Committee court criticized the SEC for its 
“superficial analysis” of applicable state law and found that the SEC had 
failed to comply with its own requirement that management sustain the 
burden of proof when seeking to omit a shareholder proposal.141 
The court characterized as “somewhat more substantial” Dow’s 
argument that the proposal could be excluded as “too general” under 
Rule 14a-8(c)(2), which permitted exclusion of proposals that are 
primarily political in nature.142  However, the court was unpersuaded by 
the Dow’s memorandum of counsel on the subject, which simply 
described the sorts of political protests of which Dow had been a target 
because of its government contracting in connection with the Vietnam 
War and then reached the “abrupt conclusion” that the proposal should 
therefore be excluded.143  The court was unwilling to connect the dots 
and to treat the proposal as representing nothing more than another 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. (stating that the SEC “made no attempt to choose between” the two “potentially 
conflicting arguments” and, relying on Dow’s stated reasons, accepted Dow’s decision to omit the 
proposals). 
 137. Id. at 680. 
 138. Id. at 680 n.29 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(a)(2), (d) (1968)). 
 139. Id. at 680. 
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90. 
 141. Med. Comm., 432 F.2d at 680. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
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example of protest tactics relating to Dow’s contracts with the 
Department of Defense.144 
Here again, the court returned to Congress’ intentions in passing 
section 14(a) of the ’34 Act, whose “overriding purpose” it was “to 
assure to corporate shareholders the ability to exercise their right— 
some would say their duty—to control the important decisions which 
affect them in their capacity as stockholders and owners of the 
corporation.”145  In light of this congressional purpose, the court could 
find no reason why management should be permitted to 
place obstacles in the path of shareholders who wish to present to their 
co-owners . . . the question of whether they wish to have their assets 
used in a manner which they believe to be more socially responsible 
but possibly less profitable than that which is dictated by present 
company policy.146 
Moreover, in this case, there was ample evidence that Dow’s 
management was itself motivated by a political purpose and not by the 
profit motive.  According to the court, Dow’s own publications 
proclaimed: 
[T]hat the decision to continue manufacturing and marketing napalm 
was made not because of business considerations, but in spite of them; 
that management in essence decided to pursue a course of activity 
which generated little profit for the shareholders and actively impaired 
the company’s public relations and recruitment activities because 
management considered this action morally and politically      
desirable. . . .  We think that there is a clear and compelling distinction 
between management’s legitimate need for freedom to apply its 
expertise in matters of day-to-day business judgment, and 
management’s patently illegitimate claim of power to treat modern 
corporations with their vast resources as personal satrapies 
implementing personal, political, or moral predilections.  It could 
scarcely be argued that management is more qualified or more entitled 
to make these kinds of decisions than the shareholders who are the true 
beneficial owners of the corporation.147 
Not only did the court think that the corporation had not borne its 
burden under the SEC’s regulations, it also asserted that the 
 
 144. Id. at 680 n.30. 
 145. Id. at 680-81. 
 146. Id. at 681.  
 147. Id. 
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regulations—at least as applied in this case—could not be harmonized 
with Congress’ intent in adopting section 14(a) of the ’34 Act.148 
The case was remanded to the SEC for reconsideration in light of 
the court’s opinion and with instructions that the basis for the SEC’s 
decision must appear in the record “not in conclusory terms but in 
sufficient detail to permit prompt and effective review.”149  The SEC 
was sufficiently concerned about the consequences of the decision to 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.150  However, 
before the Court could decide the case, Dow included the proposal in its 
annual proxy materials, and it received votes from less than 3% of the 
shares that participated.151  The Supreme Court reasoned that, given this 
meager support for the proposal, Dow may decide to include it if it were 
re-submitted in the future rather than litigate.152  The facts thus no longer 
presented an active case or controversy, and the case was dismissed as 
moot.153  The status of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion was thus unclear. 
C. The Effect of Medical Committee 
In the aftermath of Medical Committee, the number of shareholder 
proposals increased dramatically, as did the number of proposals relating 
to social issues.154  In addition, the SEC for the first time revised the 
Rule in a way that restricted the ability of management to exclude such 
proposals from its proxy materials.155  In 1972, the SEC revised the 
portion of the Rule relating to the exclusion of social proposals, 
permitting the exclusion of proposals only if they were not “significantly 
related to the business of the issuer or not within its control.”156  In 1976, 
 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 682. 
 150. SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 401 U.S. 973 (1971). 
 151. SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 405-06 (1972). 
 152. Id. at 406. 
 153. Id. at 407. 
 154. Estimates range on the number of social proposals offered during this period, but there is 
no doubt that there was a significant increase.  See Liebeler, supra note 32, at 431 (stating that the 
number of social proposals increased from six in 1972 to 322 in 1976); Schwartz & Weiss, supra 
note 22, at 637  n.11 (stating that there were 133 social proposals raised in eighty-eight separate 
shareholder meetings in 1976, both of which were record highs).  Liebeler provides a statistical 
breakdown on shareholder proposals between 1975-76 and 1982-83.  During that period, social 
proposals accounted for a high of 46.3% of all proposals in 1975-76 and reached their numerical 
peak in 1980-81, when 372 were offered.  Liebeler, supra note 32, app. at tbl.1.  Rates at which 
proposals were excluded pursuant to SEC no-action letters also peaked in 1975-76, when 38.5% of 
all proposals were excluded.  Id. 
 155. Solicitation of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 9784, 1972 WL 125400 (Sept. 22, 
1972). 
 156. Id. 
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the SEC again revised the Rule, eliminating all reference to social or 
political proposals.157 
As we shall see, the Medical Committee opinion influenced Peter 
Lovenheim to become a shareholder activist.  He was not alone.  
Between 1976 and 1983, social proposals accounted for over 20% of all 
proposals received each year by the American Society of Corporate 
Secretaries.158  However, after a 1983 revision of the Rule that required a 
proponent to own $1,000 worth of stock in the issuer, the number of 
social proposals dropped by more than half.159 
III.  FAIR IS FOWL:  THE STORY OF LOVENHEIM V. IROQUOIS BRANDS 
Peter Lovenheim was something of an amateur investor.  When he 
found out about a company that he liked, he would buy shares.  In the 
fall of 1981, he bought 200 shares of the common stock of Iroquois160 on 
the advice of his fiancée, who was a nutritionist,161 and had 
recommended the Schiff line of vitamins that Iroquois distributed.162  
Lovenheim also saw potential for Iroquois’ stock “because of its 
involvement in the expanding market for health foods and natural 
foods.”163  Within a few months of purchasing his Iroquois stock, 
Lovenheim received proxy materials from which he learned that 
Iroquois marketed Eduard Artnzer pâté de foie gras in the United 
States.164  Foie gras is a gourmet food produced from the livers of 
domesticated geese raised on a carbohydrate-rich diet.165 
 
 
 157. See Palmiter, supra note 44, at 911 (stating that the number of social and political 
proposals “exploded” after the 1976 reforms). 
 158. Liebeler, supra note 32, at 466. 
 159. See Bruce Ingersoll, Annual Meetings Are Much Calmer Affairs Under Changed SEC 
Shareholder Rules, WALL ST. J.,  Apr. 24, 1985 (“The number of shareholder resolutions filed on 
social and ethical issues fell from 215 in 1983 to 93 [in 1984] and 83 [in 1985] . . . . ”). 
 160. Affidavit of Peter C. Lovenheim at 5, Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 
554 (D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-0734) (on file with the author). 
 161. See PETER C. LOVENHEIM, PORTRAIT OF A BURGER AS A YOUNG CALF:  THE TRUE 
STORY OF ONE MAN, TWO COWS AND THE FEEDING OF A NATION 64 (2002) (describing his wife as 
a nutritionist). 
 162. Telephone Interview with Peter C. Lovenheim (Mar. 5, 2009). 
 163. Affidavit of Peter C. Lovenheim, supra note 160, at 2. 
 164. Id. 
 165. F. BARBARA ORLANS, ET AL., THE HUMAN USE OF ANIMALS:  CASE STUDIES IN ETHICAL 
CHOICE 227 (1998). 
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A. What’s Good for the Goose:  Lovenheim’s First Shareholder 
Proposal 
Lovenheim had originally been attracted to Iroquois because the 
corporation marketed products that promoted healthy lifestyles.166  He 
did not think that encouraging the consumption of pâté de foie gras was 
consistent with the rest of Iroquois’ product lines, nor did he think that 
other like-minded shareholders would want Iroquois to be involved in 
the distribution of pâté de foie gras if the production of the product 
involved significant animal cruelty.167  Although Lovenheim was 
working at the Humane Society at the time of the lawsuit168 and was 
described in the press as “an animal rights activist,”169 he would later 
describe himself as someone who did some work for the Humane 
Society when he was just out of school but was not “an animal rights 
person.”170  Lovenheim was not a strict vegetarian.171 
The corporation’s view of itself was very different from the way 
Lovenheim understood it.  Although it did market natural foods and 
vitamins as two of its product lines, those product lines were by no 
means central to the corporation’s mission or identity.  Iroquois started 
out as a brewery and, at the time Lovenheim invested, distributed many 
diverse product lines, ranging from Champale to Yoohoo, through 
numerous subsidiaries.172 
 
 166. Id. at 229. 
 167. Telephone interview with Peter C. Lovenheim, supra note 162. 
 168. See Tischler, supra note 13, at 40. 
 169. See Jerry Knight, Force-Feeding Moral Issues onto Corporate Agendas, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 11, 1985, at Bus. 1 (referring to the case as a “landmark lawsuit” brought by “an animal rights 
activist”). 
 170. See LOVENHEIM, supra  note 161, at 192 (expressing concern, as he was preparing to visit 
a slaughterhouse that he might be denied entry because of the company’s suspicions as to his 
motives).  Lovenheim never wanted to become a one-issue person.  Interview with Peter C. 
Lovenheim (Sept. 27, 2009) (audio tape on file with author).  He had worked as a freelance 
journalist during law school, and after he graduated, his first job was with a small non-profit that 
promoted the legal interests of journalists in freedom of information.  Id.  Having worked on that 
issue for a short time, and having written a couple of pieces of journalism that related to animal law, 
Lovenheim then moved to a position with the Humane Society.  Id.  He was there for only a couple 
of years before he moved on to his next project.  Id. 
 171. See  id. at 64 (“My diet mostly reflects the ambivalence I’ve felt since childhood about 
eating animals:  sometimes I have; sometimes I haven’t.”).  Lovenheim claims that he has been a 
vegetarian since Portrait of a Burger was published, but his son claims to have seen him eating a 
turkey sandwich only recently.  Interview with Peter C. Lovenheim, supra note 170. 
 172. Telephone interview with Ralph Halpern (July 10, 2009). 
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According to Lovenheim, the process of force-feeding usually 
begins when the birds are four-months old.173  At farms where the 
process has been mechanized, the birds are placed in a metal brace and 
the neck is stretched so that a funnel may be inserted 10-12 inches down 
the bird’s throat.174  Four hundred grams of corn mash are then pumped 
into the birds’ stomachs, while an elastic band around its neck prevents 
regurgitation.175  Where the process is done by hand, the feeder uses a 
funnel and a stick to force the mash down the bird’s throat.176  The birds 
are force fed for between 15 and 28 days, and shortly thereafter they are 
slaughtered.177  During the brief period of force-feeding, the geese 
double their weight, but their livers swell until they account for up to 
10% of the bird’s total weight.  An ordinary goose liver weighs about 
120 grams; the liver of a force-fed bird weighs between 800 and 1000 
grams.178  Up to 10% of the birds die before they can be slaughtered as a 
result of the forced feeding.179 
On May 10, 1982, Lovenheim wrote to Iroquois’ management and 
requested that it look into the possibility that the pâté product that it was 
distributing was produced through forced-feeding of geese.180  The 
corporation did not respond to that letter or to subsequent 
communications.181  So, on December 14, 1982, Lovenheim, on his own 
behalf and on behalf of the Humane Society, wrote a letter to Terence J. 
Fox, the president of Iroquois, enclosing a shareholder proposal for 
inclusion in the company’s proxy materials for action at the next 
Iroquois annual shareholder meeting to be held in May 1983.182  The 
letter stated that the proposal was prepared in accordance with the 
relevant regulations promulgated by the SEC.183  Lovenheim also 
notified the corporation that he intended to attend the annual shareholder 
meeting.184 
 
 173. Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, 618 F. Supp. 554, 556 n.2 (D.D.C. 1985) (citing Affidavit 
of Peter C. Lovenheim, supra note 160). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. ORLANS, supra note 165, at 229. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Transcript of Annual Meeting of Stockholders of Iroquois Brands Ltd. 12 (May 10, 1983) 
[hereinafter 1983 Annual Meeting Transcript] (on file with the author). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Letter from Peter C. Lovenheim to Terrence J. Fox, Chairman of the Bd, Iroquois Brands, 
Ltd. (Dec. 14, 1982) (on file with the author). 
 183. Id. (citing 7 C.F.R. 240.14a-8). 
 184. Id. 
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Under the regulations operative at the time, Lovenheim was eligible 
to submit a proposal based on his ownership of 200 shares of stock in 
the corporation for at least one year prior to the shareholder meeting.185  
Lovenheim’s proposal noted that Iroquois “strives to maintain a 
reputation as a distributor of wholesome foods” and characterized the 
proposal as seeking “to assure that [Iroquois Brands, Ltd.] is not 
inadvertently promoting cruelty to animals and does not risk damaging 
its reputation as a distributor of wholesome food products.”186  The 
proposal then asked the corporation to do the following: 
[F]orm a committee to study the methods by which its French supplier 
produces pâté de foie gras, and report to the shareholders its findings, 
together with its opinion, based on expert consultation, as to whether 
or not this production method causes undue distress, pain, or suffering 
to the animals involved and, if so, whether further distribution of this 
product would risk damaging the good reputation of the Corporation 
and should therefore be discontinued until a more humane production 
method is developed.187 
The proposal indicates how, notwithstanding Medical Committee, 
shareholders still had to steer between the Scylla of generality and the 
Charybdis of specificity. 
Presumably, Lovenheim knew or suspected that pâté de foie gras is 
always produced through the force-feeding of geese, and he really 
wanted Iroquois to stop distributing the product because its distribution 
encouraged what he considered a form of animal cruelty.  But under the 
SEC rules operative at the time, shareholders could not bring proposals 
relating to the continuation of a particular product, as control over 
ordinary business operations was entrusted to management alone.188  Nor 
could Lovenheim bring a proposal that simply denounced animal cruelty 
and demanded that Iroquois adopt a position consistent with his ethical 
objections to inhumane treatment of animals without running afoul of 
the SEC regulation intended to prevent the shareholder proposal from 
being abused as a mechanism of general political protest.189  As a result, 
the shareholder proposal has a bit of absurdist theater about it.  Proposals 
must ask the board to form a committee to investigate a matter and make 
 
 185. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(1) (1982). 
 186. Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders of Iroquois Brands, Ltd., scheduled on May 
10, 1983, at 18 (Mar. 28, 1983) [hereinafter 1983 Notice of Annual Meeting] (on file with the 
author). 
 187. Id.; see also Lovenheim, v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 556 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 188. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1982). 
 189. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5) (1982). 
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recommendations.190  That way, the shareholder does not interfere with 
the conduct of ordinary business operations, as the final decision is left 
in the discretion of the board. 
The corporation responded with a letter from Iroquois’ General 
Counsel requesting certification of the number of shares owned by Mr. 
Lovenheim and the Humane Society.191  Lovenheim got back to Iroquois 
just five days later, providing certification of the shares owned by the 
Humane Society.  As the SEC regulations did not require him to state the 
quantity of shares owned by a person bringing a shareholder proposal, 
Lovenheim pointed out that he did not need to provide the certification 
requested, but he did state that he had owned 200 shares of Iroquois 
common stock since 1981.192 
The corporation had no further objection to Lovenheim’s proposal.  
It included the proposal in the proxy materials distributed in advance of 
its May 1983 shareholder meeting.193  It also included its own 
recommendation that shareholders vote against Lovenheim’s 
proposal.194  While noting that the corporation “deplores cruelty to 
animals in any form and commends the Humane Society of the United 
States for the important work it does to alleviate such practices,”195 
management gave the following reasons for its opposition:  (1) Iroquois 
exercised no control over the production of the French pâté; (2) the 
product is tested and approved by the Federal Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA); (3) it is unnecessary to form a panel of directors 
to study an issue over which the board has no control; and (4) the 
product in question “represents an infinitely small percent of Iroquois’ 
sale and profits” – in fact the expert consultation called for in the 
 
 190. Proposals calling for the formation of a committee of investigation have become the norm 
when shareholders offer social proposals.  See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers 
Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 821 F. Supp. 877, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (addressing the 
excludability of a proposal requesting that Wal-Mart’s directors prepare and distribute reports 
relating to the company’s equal opportunity hiring and procurement policies); N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. 
Sys. v. Dole, Food Co, 795 F. Supp. 95, 96, (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (addressing the excludability of a 
proposal requesting the Board of Directors to establish a committee for the purpose of evaluating 
the impact of proposals for health care reform and their impact on the company); Austin v. Consol. 
Edison Co., of  N.Y., Inc., 788 F. Supp. 192, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (addressing the excludability of a 
proposal requesting that shareholders adopt a non-binding resolution endorsing the idea that the 
corporation’s employees should be allowed to retire after 30 years of service, regardless of age). 
 191. Letter from Ralph L. Halperrn, Gen. Counsel for Iroquois Brands, Ltd., to Peter C. 
Lovenheim (Jan. 6, 1983) (on file with the author). 
 192. Letter from Peter C. Lovenheim to Ralph L. Halpern, Gen. Counsel for Iroquois Brands, 
Ltd., (Jan. 11, 1983) (on file with the author). 
 193. Notice 1983 Notice of Annual Meeting, supra note 186, at 17-19. 
 194. Id. at 19. 
 195. Id. 
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proposal would entail costs in excess of the expected profitability of the 
product.196 
As he stated he would, Lovenheim appeared at that annual 
shareholder meeting and presented his proposal.197  In his presentation, 
Lovenheim offered a point-by-point refutation of management’s 
arguments.198  He pointed out that FDA regulation does not encompass 
any test for humane treatment.199  “You can import brains pulled from 
the skulls of live dogs, and the FDA would accept it for importation,” 
Lovenheim noted.200  Lovenheim next noted that it simply was not true 
that Iroquois had no control over the production of the product, since 
consumers can always pressure producers to change their production 
processes.201  Lovenheim also addressed management’s concerns about 
the cost of expert consultation on the matter by pointing out that the 
experts in question would likely be academics, who do not charge much 
for their services.202  If the charges proved excessive, Lovenheim 
offered, the Humane Society would provide expert consultations at no 
cost.203  Finally, Lovenheim urged shareholders’ to reject management’s 
position that humane treatment of animals was simply too costly.204  “I 
say that if an investigation would cost too much, then we should stop 
selling the product, or if we are to continue selling the product, then we 
should have the investigation.”205  Another shareholder then rose in 
support of Lovenheim’s proposal.206  In the ensuing vote, Lovenheim’s 
proposal garnered 50,000 votes, just over 5% of those cast.207 
B. The Goose Chase:  From Proponent to Litigant 
Encouraged by this result, Lovenheim offered the same resolution 
the following year.208  He wrote well in advance to seek information 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. 1983 Annual Meeting Transcript, supra note 180, at 10. 
 198. Id. at 15-18. 
 199. Id. at 16. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 17. 
 203. Id. at 16-17. 
 204. Id. at 17. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See id. at 18 (“[I]t seems to me since it is such a cruel way to obtain [liver pâté], it would 
be a feather in Iroquois’ hat to do without it.”). 
 207. Memorandum of Law, supra note 14, at 2. 
 208. Shareholder Proposal and Supporting Statement (submitted by Peter Lovenheim for 
inclusion in Iroquois Brands’ 1984 Proxy Statement) (included as Attachment 3 to the Affidavit of 
Peter C. Lovenheim, supra note 160) (Dec. 5, 1983) (on file with the author). 
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regarding the date for the upcoming shareholder meeting.209  To 
Lovenheim’s surprise, the company responded this time by notifying 
him (through corporate counsel) that Iroquois considered the proposal 
excludable.210  During the intervening year, the SEC had again revised 
its regulations.211 
The SEC now required shareholders to own at least 1% or $1,000 
worth of the corporation’s stock for at least one year prior to the 
submission of the proposal.212  In addition, the rules now permitted 
exclusion of proposals relating to business operations accounting for less 
than 5% of the issuer’s total assets and for less than 5% of net earnings 
and gross sales and not otherwise significantly related to the issuer's 
business.213  Thus, when Lovenheim submitted his proposal in 1983, 
which was virtually identical to the one submitted one year earlier, 
Iroquois’ only response was to copy him on a letter to the SEC, which 
stated its intention to omit the proposal from its proxy statement on the 
ground that it related “to operations which account for less than 5 
percent of [Iroquois’] total assets . . . and for less than 5 percent of its net 
earnings and gross sales . . . and is not otherwise significantly related to” 
Iroquois’ business.214 
However, as Lovenheim pointed out in his responsive 
memorandum of law, Iroquois thus did nothing more than re-state the 
purportedly applicable SEC rule.215  Such a simple assertion was not 
sufficient to meet the corporation’s burden, said Lovenheim, under the 
applicable federal regulations.216  In any case, Lovenheim argued, even 
 
 209. Letter from Peter C. Lovenheim to James P. McCaffrey, President, Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 
(Oct. 19, 1983) (on file with the author). 
 210. Letter from Ralph L. Halpern, Gen. Counsel for Iroquois Brands, Ltd., to Peter C. 
Lovenheim (Nov. 2. 1983) (on file with the author). 
 211. Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 20,091, 1983 WL 33272 (Aug. 
16, 1983).  The story behind this revision was been told in some detail in scholarship published not 
long after its adoption.  See Cane, supra note 16, at 62-67 (characterizing the SEC’s motivation in 
formulating the revisions as proposing a total reexamination of the reasons for the rule’s existence).  
Liebeler, supra note 32, at 433-37 (describing the three approaches considered by the SEC before it 
adopted the first of those options in the 1983 amendments). 
 212. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(1)(i) (1984). 
 213. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5) (1984). 
 214. Letter from Ralph L. Halpern, Gen. Counsel for Iroquois Brands, Ltd., to SEC, Div. of 
Corp. Fin. (Dec. 13, 1983) (on file with the author) (included as Attachment 4 to the Affidavit of 
Peter C. Lovenheim, supra note 160). 
 215. See Memorandum of Law, supra note 14, at 4 (“The letter . . . contains nothing more than 
a simple assertion that the Proposal is covered by Rule 14a-8(c)(5).”). 
 216. Id. at 5 (citing 41 Fed. Reg. § 234 at 52997 (1976)) (stating that the issuer bears the 
burden of demonstrating it may rely upon one of the substantive grounds for omission of a 
shareholder proposal). 
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if it were true that the product at issue did not constitute 5% of Iroquois’ 
assets, earnings, or sales, Iroquois could not show that the product was 
not “otherwise significantly related” to its business.217  Setting aside the 
broader social importance of animal cruelty, Lovenheim argued that, 
given that Iroquois was a health food company, whose major product 
lines included natural vitamins, herb teas and other natural foods that did 
not include any animal products in their ingredients, the proposal was 
significantly related to Iroquois’ economic interests.218  This was 
especially so, Lovenheim contended, because consumers of health food 
and natural food products are more likely to value humane treatment of 
animals than is the general public.219  Lovenheim cited to Iroquois’ 
advertisements of its products in magazines such as Vegetarian Times 
and Prevention, both of which clearly were marketed towards audiences 
concerned about animal cruelty.220 
Finally, Lovenheim argued that the SEC, in using the phrase 
“significantly related” in the relevant regulation, did not mean to permit 
corporations to omit proposals that related to significant social and 
ethical issues.221  The Commission recognized that there are many 
instances in which the matter involved in a proposal is significant to an 
issuer’s business, even though such significance is not apparent from an 
economic viewpoint.222 
Addressing none of the legal arguments and factual claims in 
Lovenheim’s twenty-page memorandum, the SEC sided with Iroquois in 
a two-paragraph no-action letter.223  The SEC simply noted that “[t]here 
appears to be some basis for your opinion that the proposal may be 
omitted from the Company’s proxy material under Rule 14a-8(c)(5)” 
and concluded that there would be no enforcement action if the 
Lovenheim proposal were omitted from Iroquois’ proxy materials.224 
Lovenheim appealed the decision of the Division of Corporation 
Finance to the SEC’s five commissioners.225  His memorandum of law 
submitted to the commissioners rehearsed the arguments from his earlier 
 
 217. Id. at 6. 
 218. Id. at 6-7. 
 219. Id. at 7-9. 
 220. Id. at 9-10. 
 221. Id. at 13. 
 222. Id. (citing 41 Fed. Reg. 234, 52997 (1976)). 
 223. Response of the Office of Chief Counsel, SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin., Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 
SEC File No. 1-5387 (Jan 23, 1984) (on file with the author). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Letter from Peter C. Lovenheim to SEC (Jan. 30, 1984) (on file with the author) 
(appealing SEC’s decision and incorporating Memorandum of Law, supra note 14, at 2). 
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memorandum, which it incorporated by reference226 and made the 
additional argument that the proposal was not new and had won more 
than 5% of votes cast at the 1983 shareholder meeting.227  The 
Commission declined review.228 
Lovenheim attempted to settle his differences with the corporation 
in advance of the annual shareholder meeting.  He offered to drop the 
shareholder proposal if Iroquois would simply agree to set up a 
committee to investigate the methods used for the manufacture of the 
pâté distributed by the corporation.229  Lovenheim recommended that 
three members of the animal protection community serve as ex officio 
members of the committee:  one representative from American Society 
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, one representative from the 
Humane Society and Lovenheim himself.230  Iroquois was not receptive 
to such a settlement.231 
Lovenheim was undeterred.  In fact, the SEC’s casual, unreflective 
decision denying review of his appeal of the SEC staff’s issuance of a 
no-action letter infuriated and inspired him.232  He prepared his 
shareholder proposal for a third time.  On October 17, 1984, he sent the 
proposal for inclusion in Iroquois’ 1985 proxy statement.233  Once again, 
Iroquois responded with a letter to the SEC stating its intention to omit 
Lovenheim’s proposal from its proxy materials.234  This time, the 
corporation took the trouble to present some statistics, indicating that the 
pâté at issue accounted for less than 0.05% of the corporation’s sales, 
less than 0.3% of its net earnings and less than 0.09% of its assets for 
1982 and 1983, statistics not expected to change significantly in 1984.235  
 
 226. Memorandum of Law, supra note 14, at 1. 
 227. Id. at 2-3. 
 228. See Letter from Ralph L. Halpern, Gen. Counsel for Iroquois Brands, Ltd., to SEC Div. of 
Corp. Fin. (Dec. 21, 1984 ) (on file with the author).  Lovenheim now recalls that he was motivated 
to pursue his law suit as much by frustration with the SEC’s cavalier rejection of his legal 
arguments as disappointment with Iroquois’ seeming indifference to his concerns.  Audio tape:  
Interview with Peter C. Lovenheim, supra note 171.  Lovenheim remembers having typed his legal 
memoranda himself, on an electric typewriter, not a word processor, after work in the evenings and 
on weekends.  Id. 
 229. Letter from Peter C. Lovenheim to Ralph L. Halpern, Gen. Counsel for Iroquois Brands, 
Ltd. (Apr. 24, 1984) (on file with the author). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Letter from Peter C. Lovenheim to John Hoyt, President of the Humane Soc’y, (May 31, 
1984) (on file with the author). 
 232. Interview with Peter C. Lovenheim, supra note 171. 
 233. Letter from Peter C. Lovenheim to Iroquois Brands, Ltd. (Oct. 17, 1984) (on file with the 
author). 
 234. Letter from Ralph L. Halpern to SEC Div. of Corp. Fin., supra note 228. 
 235. Id. 
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On January 9, 1985, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance once 
again issued a response to Iroquois, stating that it would not recommend 
any enforcement action if Iroquois were to omit Lovenheim’s proposal 
from its proxy materials.236 
C. Iroquois’ Goose Is Cooked in the D.C. District Court 
As a relatively recent law graduate, Lovenheim still had a fresh 
recollection of Medical Committee.237  In Lovenheim’s view, that 
decision compelled a ruling in his case obligating Iroquois to distribute 
his proposal, because it raised a socially significant issue that was related 
to Iroquois’ business.  So Lovenheim bypassed an appeal to the SEC 
commissioners and filed suit in the D.C. District Court238 seeking an 
injunction ordering Iroquois to distribute his proposal.239  This time, he 
retained Jonathan Eisenberg, an experienced attorney who agreed to 
work pro bono and to help him on the brief submitted in support of his 
suit for injunctive relief.240  Lovenheim’s motivation in skipping review 
by the Commission may have been to save time and resources.  It also 
may have been strategic, since at oral argument in the District Court, his 
counsel argued that the court owed no deference to a decision by the 
SEC’s staff to issue a no-action letter.241  It may well have proved harder 
to persuade the court that it owed no deference to the SEC 
Commissioners’ interpretation of the agency’s own rules. 
Jonathan Eisenberg acknowledged during oral argument that 
Lovenheim did not bring the proposal because he expected it to win a 
majority of the shareholder vote.242  Rather, the purpose was to “force 
management to take a hard look at the conduct they are engaged in” and 
 
 236. Response of the Office of Chief Counsel, SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin., dated Jan. 29, 1985 (on 
file with the author). 
 237. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 238. Section 27 of the ’34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(a), has been construed as permitting appeal 
of a no-action letter directly to the Federal District Court.  See Lovenheim, v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 
618 F. Supp. 554, 558 (D.D.C. 1985).  (noting the parties’ agreement that section 27 governs and 
that jurisdiction was proper because Lovenheim had alleged that Iroquois violated securities laws in 
the jurisdiction by causing misleading proxy materials to be mailed there). 
 239. Lovenheim, 618 F. Supp. at 556. 
 240. Tischler, supra note 13, at 41-42. 
 241. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 15, at 17-18  
(statement of counsel for the Plaintiff contending that because Lovenheim had not sought 
Commission review there was no reason for the court to show deference to the SEC staff’s issuance 
of a no-action letter). 
 242. Id. at 5 (acknowledging that shareholder proposals almost never succeed);  See also Dent, 
supra note 32, at 4-5 (“[N]o shareholder proposal opposed by management . . . has ever come close 
to receiving a majority shareholder vote.”). 
11- TELMAN_MACRO FINAL.DOCM 2/24/2012  9:59 AM 
322 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:291 
to “ask themselves whether they can defend that” conduct.243  Eisenberg 
contended that the effectiveness of this tactic was evidenced by the fact 
that in 1982, thirty-two shareholder proposals had been withdrawn as 
moot, suggesting that the corporations chose to adopt the measures 
proposed rather than put them to a shareholder vote.244  Eisenberg 
reminded the court that the proposal had won 5% of the shareholder vote 
when it had been included in Iroquois’ 1983 proxy materials and stated 
that if the proposal were again included, he believed there to be “a 
significant chance” that Iroquois would decide to discontinue 
distribution of the product.245 
On the law, Eisenberg encouraged the court to consider the relevant 
regulation, 14a-8(c)(5), as constituting a two-part test, both of which 
have to be met for the corporation to be permitted to exclude a 
proposal.246  Lovenheim did not challenge Iroquois’ claim that the 
economic portion of 14a-8(c)(5) was met,247 but Eisenberg stressed that 
in 1976 the SEC rewrote the regulation, removing language that 
permitted the corporation to omit a proposal “if it is submitted primarily 
for general political, social ends” and adding language permitting 
omission of proposals that are not economically significant and “that are 
not significantly related to the issuer’s business.”248 
The effect of the change was, in Eisenberg’s view, to eliminate 
from the SEC’s regulation any indication that social proposals “were 
suspect.”249  Since the 1976 changes, the SEC had required that all social 
proposals be included so long as the issuer’s business was in any way 
implicated in the proposal.250  Eisenberg’s argument suggests that the 
SEC learned from Medical Committee and sought to avoid a head-on 
collision with the judiciary over whether or not it could permit exclusion 
 
 243. Id. at 5-6. 
 244. Id. at 6.  But see Dent, supra note 32, at 21-22 (arguing that it is extremely unlikely that 
corporate management would change policies in response to shareholder proposals that are 
resoundingly defeated). 
 245. Id. at 7. 
 246. See id. at 9 (“As a two part test it is stated in the conjunctive not the disjunctive.  So you 
clearly have to meet both parts of the test in order to omit the proposal.”). 
 247. See id. at 8 (“[W]e do accept that this proposal is not economically significant under the 
SEC’s 5 percent test”).  See also Lovenheim, 618 F. Supp. at 559 (“Plaintiff does not contest that his 
proposed resolution relates to a matter of little economic significance . . . .”). 
 248.  Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 15, at 12-13. 
 249. Id. at 13. 
 250. See id. at 13-14 (suggesting that the SEC wanted to comfort people when it changed the 
rule again in 1982 by pointing out the SEC did not intend to change its policies with respect to 
requiring that proposals relating to social, political, and ethical issues be included in proxy 
materials). 
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of social proposals without undermining Congress’ intent in passing 
section 14(a) of the ’34 Act.251 
The requirement that the proposal be significantly related was met 
here, Eisenberg contended, because Iroquois made $70,000 worth of 
sales in pâté de foie gras.252  If the issue was significant and the 
corporation was doing even “one completely outrageous thing a year,” 
Eisenberg maintained, the corporation could not refuse to include a 
proposal relating to that conduct on the ground that it was not 
economically significant, in that the conduct did not relate to 5% of the 
corporation’s assets.253 
Counsel for Iroquois stressed that the connection between the issue 
raised by the proposal and Iroquois’ business was “de minimis,” and that 
the SEC could not possibly have intended to require corporations to 
include in proxy statements every single social proposal that had any 
conceivable connection to the corporation’s operations.254  Pâté de foie 
gras accounted for only a tiny portion of Iroquois’ business.255  
According to the affidavit of its president, Iroquois had annual revenues 
of $141 million, $6 million in annual profits and $78 million in assets.256  
Its sales of pâté amounted to just $79,000, resulting in a net loss of 
$3,121.257  The company valued its total assets related to pâté at 
$34,000.258  Accordingly, Iroquois thought it was well within its rights 
under the relevant SEC rule to deny Lovenheim’s request. 
Iroquois argued, in essence, that the main point of 14a-8(c)(5) was 
to make certain that proposals relate to significant portions of the 
issuer’s business, even if they raise significant political, social or ethical 
issues.259  Corporations are business entities.  They and the SEC are 
primarily interested in economic matters, Iroquois argued, with respect 
 
 251. See id. at 14 (arguing that the history of the regulation “suggests very, very strongly that 
in response to the Medical Committee decision, the commission learned that it couldn’t exclude 
proposals raising significant ethical or social issues that were related to the issuer’s business”). 
 252. Id. at 15-16. 
 253. Id. at 16. 
 254. Id. at 21-22 (statement of Hadrian Katz, counsel for Iroquois). 
 255. Lovenheim, v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 558 (D.D.C. 1985).  
 256. Id. 
 257. Id.  
 258. Id. at 558-59. 
 259. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 15, at 23 
(contending that Plaintiff’s construction of the Rule would delete the economic tests from the rule 
and allow in any proposal that relates to an important social issue). 
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to proxy statements as in all other areas.260  Medical Committee, as 
Iroquois understood it, stood only for the proposition that a corporation 
may not exclude a proposal simply on the ground that it raises ethical 
and philosophical issues.261  The opinion did not require the inclusion of 
proposals that are of no real economic significance to the corporation.262 
The court sided with Lovenheim on the decisive point.  Although 
Medical Committee was decided under an earlier version of the Rule and 
the economic significance of Dow’s production of napalm was not an 
issue in the case, the court noted that the D.C. Circuit, in deciding 
Medical Committee, had assumed that “napalm was not economically 
significant to Dow.”263  After a brief review of the Rule, the court 
concluded that there was simply no evidence that the SEC intended to 
limit its understanding of the “significance” of a proposal to economic 
criteria, as Iroquois suggested it should.264  The court recognized the 
social significance of Lovenheim’s proposal and the fact that it 
“implicate[d] significant levels of sales” for Iroquois.265  It therefore 
granted Lovenheim the injunctive relief he sought.266 
The court’s factual findings were significant.  As evidence of the 
social significance of Lovenheim’s proposal, the court  provided only a 
footnote referencing Lovenheim’s brief.267  Lovenheim had argued that 
humane treatment of animals is a “foundation of western culture.”268  In 
support of this argument, he cited the Seven Laws of Noah,269 as well as 
animal protection statutes beginning with one enacted by the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1641.270  By the time of the litigation, 
such statutes had been enacted in all fifty states.271 
A court might have considered such evidence as strikingly weak, as 
none of it specifically addressed a state interest in regulating the force-
 
 260. See id. at 24 (“The criterion for the inclusion of material in corporate annual reports in 
filings with the SEC in proxy statements and in all other areas, is the economic materiality of the 
issue.”). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Lovenheim, 618 F. Supp. at 560 (citing Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 
659, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). 
 264. Id. at 561. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 562. 
 267. Id. at 559 n.8. 
 268. Id. 
 269. See Genesis 9:4 (prohibiting consumption of flesh taken from a live animal). 
 270. Lovenheim, 618 F. Supp. at 559 n.8. 
 271. Id. 
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feeding of geese.272  At the time the case was decided, Lovenheim could 
not have cited to a single federal, state, or locality that had attempted to 
regulate the force-feeding of geese.273  Indeed, at oral argument, 
Iroquois’ counsel made the policy argument that corporations should not 
have to decide “which issues are sufficiently important to be put to the 
shareholders on philosophical and ethical terms and which issues are 
not.”274  Iroquois’ counsel obviously thought that the issue of force-
feeding of geese in France was not significant,275 a view apparently 
shared by “proxy resolution aficionados.”276  Even Lovenheim’s counsel 
came very close to conceding that the issue was not as significant as the 
use of napalm raised in Medical Committee.277  Neither party offered 
expert testimony on the political, social, or ethical significance of the 
issue.  One is hard pressed to imagine where such expertise would reside 
or why it should reside in a corporation, in the SEC, or in a court. 278  
 
 272. Better evidence of the social significance of Lovenheim’s proposal was furnished in 
Loveheim’s affidavit, which cited efforts by “leading organizations in the field of animal care” to 
discourage the practice of force-feeding.  Id.  Still, it is not clear why the fact that some 
organizations with a special interest in an issue raise that issue should be treated as evidence of 
widespread concern. 
 273. The first such regulation was introduced in California in 2004.  Under the new law, as of 
July 1, 2012, “[a] product may not be sold in California if it is the result of force feeding a bird for 
the purpose of enlarging the bird's liver beyond normal size.”  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
25982 (West 2009).  The City of Chicago attempted a ban on foie gras in 2006, but it apparently 
was not enforced.  See, e.g., Josh Noel, Let 'em Eat Foie Gras, They Declare; Almost 4 Months After 
Ban, A Number of Restaurants Appear to be Dishing Up the Delicacy with Impunity, CHIC. TRIB., 
Dec. 21, 2006, at C1 (suggesting the city’s Department of Public Health was hesitant to fine 
restaurants that ignored a ban on the product); Josh Noel et al., Chicago’s Wild Foie Gras Chase:  
Mayor Daley Calls the Ban the ‘Silliest’ Law. Restaurants Across Town Serve up the Delicacy in 
Defiance. Now the Question is Whether City Officials Will Actually Try to Enforce the New Law, 
CHIC. TRIB., Aug. 23, 2006, at C1 (reporting brisk sales of foie gras after Mayor Daley denounced a 
ban on the product as the “silliest law” ever passed by the City Council).  The ban was officially 
lifted in May 2008.  Mark Caro & Dan Mihalopoulos, Daley Special:  Foie Gras Back on the Menu, 
CHIC. TRIB., May 15, 2008, at A1. 
 274. Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 15, at 25. 
 275. See id. (“Now, I am prepared to concede today, with tongue a little bit in cheek . . . that 
their issue about the geese in France is a very important issue.”). 
 276. See Cane, supra note 16, at 61 (noting the notoriety of Lovenheim’s proposal). 
 277. Comparing the Lovenheim case to Medical Committee, Eisenberg said, “We think that 
although this case arises in a less – not less serious, in a different faculty context, that the issue 
again is pretty much the same.” Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra 
note 15, at 12. 
 278. See Palmiter, supra note 44, at 905-06 (“Rule 14a-8’s ‘proper subject’ jurisprudence 
flounders without any hope of judicial or legislative correction.”). 
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Determining which issues are “important” is not within the institutional 
competence of any of those bodies.279 
Leaving significance aside, there was also the question of what 
constitutes “significantly related” to the business operations of the 
issuer.280  Lovenheim’s counsel offered that a proposal advocating that 
the corporation cease doing business in South Africa would be 
excludable if the corporation did not in fact do business there and that a 
proposal like Lovenheim’s would not have to be submitted to the 
shareholders of IBM if IBM did not import pâté de foie gras.281  But 
Iroquois’ counsel countered that “clever and imaginative lawyers will 
always be able to think of some tenuous link to the business of the 
corporation.”282  A shareholder might argue that there is a significant 
relation between IBM’s business operations and pâté de foie gras if it 
offers the delicacy for purchase in its employee cafeteria once a 
month.283  In response, Eisenberg noted that the problem had not 
arisen; IBM shareholders had brought no proposals objecting to the 
items on the menu in the employee cafeteria.284 
Nor is the basis clear for the court’s finding that sales of pâté de 
foie gras “implicated significant levels of sales” for Iroquois Brands.285  
The court had earlier noted that, because sales of pâté de foie gras 
accounted for only $34,000 of the company’s assets, and that sales of 
pâté de foie gras had resulted in a net loss, the proposal implicated 
“none of the company’s net earnings and less than 0.05% of its 
assets.”286  In a footnote, the court noted that the result in the case would 
have been different if the proposal had no “meaningful relationship to 
the business of” the corporation.287  Still, the court’s willingness to 
accept as socially significant any proposal relating to a subject about 
which some national non-profit organizations had expressed concern, 
coupled with its willingness to think it significantly related to a business 
if it accounts for 0.05% of a corporations’ assets, suggested that 
 
 279. See id. at 910 (“[T]he current rule’s attempt at merit regulation lays on the staff the 
impossible task of deducing what should be of interest to investment-minded and public-minded 
shareholders and what should not be of interest.”). 
 280. Transcript, Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 15, at 13. 
 281. Id. at 15. 
 282. Id. at 27. 
 283. Id. at 26. 
 284. Id. at 28. 
 285. Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 561 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 286. Id. at 559-60. 
 287. Id. at 561 n.16. 
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corporations could be obligated to distribute shareholder proposals on 
nearly any subject that in any way related to their businesses. 
There was a great deal of media interest in the case, with articles 
appearing in The Washington Post,288 The Los Angeles Times,289 and 
The Wall Street Journal,290 among other newspapers.291  The 
Washington Post was especially vocal in its support for Lovenheim’s 
brand of shareholder activism:  “There isn’t a company in the country 
that couldn’t benefit from 10 tough questions from stockholders at its 
annual meeting this year.  But there probably isn’t one company in 10 
that will face them.”292  Given the timing of the opinion, Iroquois had to 
acquiesce, as there was insufficient time to appeal the decision before 
the next annual shareholder meeting,293 which was held just weeks after 
the District Court’s decision.294 
Lovenheim attended the meeting, as required under the regulations, 
and he presented his proposal to the shareholders and their proxies.  The 
reception was far from warm.295  Lovenheim’s proposal received less 
than 8% of the votes cast by Iroquois’ shareholders.296  As a result, 
Iroquois would not be required to include Lovenheim’s proposal or 
another proposal on the same subject matter for three years.297  Despite 
the court victory and the publicity, ordinary shareholders were 
unmoved.298  Or were they?  Within months of the shareholder meeting, 
 
 288. Philip Smith, Shareholders to Be Given Pâté Question, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1985, at 
E3; Jerry Knight, Force-Feeding Moral Issues onto Corporate Agendas, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 
1985, at Bus. 1. 
 289. Michael A. Hiltzik, Ruling Aids Resolutions on Ethical Issues, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1985, 
at B2. 
 290. Ingersoll, supra note 159. 
 291. Timothy Bannon, Where’s the Liver?, UPI, MAR. 2, 1985, available at, LEXIS, News. 
 292. Knight, supra note 288. 
 293. Ralph Halpern, Iroquois’ general counsel at the time of the litigation recalls that there was 
no time to appeal the decision before the annual shareholder meeting. Telephone interview with 
Ralph Halpern, supra note 172. 
 294. Tischler, supra note 13, at 42.  The District Court’s order is dated March 27, 1985.  See 
Lovenheim, 618 F. Supp. 554.  Iroquois’ shareholder meeting was held six weeks later, on May 14, 
1985.  See Iroquois Brands, Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders (Apr. 12, 1985) (on file with 
the author). 
 295. Telephone interview with Peter Lovenheim, supra note 162. 
 296. Stipulation of Dismissal at 1, Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554 
(D.D.C. 1985) (No. 85-0734). 
 297. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(12)). 
 298. See Tischler, supra note 13, at 42 (describing the proposal as having been “roundly 
defeated”). 
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Iroquois sold the unit responsible for importing pâté de foie gras, 
announcing that it now considered the issue put behind the company.299 
Lovenheim comes on the tail end of a period in the history of 
shareholder proposals when individual shareholders were the dominant 
shareholder activists.300  In the 1980s, institutional investors, first church 
groups and then pension funds, began to play a leading role in 
promulgating shareholder proposals.301  Lovenheim is a paradigmatic 
transitional case because, although Peter Lovenheim brought his 
proposal in his own behalf, he also did so on behalf of the Humane 
Society of the United States.302  Moreover, Lovenheim worked closely 
with organizations opposed to animal cruelty in attempting to use his 
shareholder proposal as part of a broader strategy to persuade Iroquois to 
stop marketing pâté de foie gras.  His case suggests the difficulties an 
individual investor might face in trying to put pressure on a corporation 
through the mechanism of the shareholder proposal and thus illustrates 
why the transition from individual shareholder activists to institutional 
activism might have occurred. 
D. Lovenheim’s Further Adventures in Animal Law 
After his experience with Iroquois, Lovenheim, having returned to 
his native Rochester, began offering his services as a sort of freelance 
 
 299. ORLANS, supra note 165, at 231, (citing personal correspondence with Ralph L. Halpern, 
Jaeckle, Fleischmann & Mugel (Apr. 13, 1988)).  Although Lovenheim believes that his shareholder 
proposal and the adverse publicity associated with it influenced Iroquois’ decision to discontinue the 
product, Halpern contends that he remembers quite clearly that the controversy over Lovenheim’s 
proposal had nothing to do with the corporation’s decision to discontinue a product that was a tiny 
portion of its business and had never been profitable for the corporation.  Telephone interview with 
Ralph Halpern (July 10, 2009). 
 300. See Gillian & Starks, supra note 25, at 56 (providing a short history of shareholder 
activism and noting that the eclipse of individual investors as the proponents of shareholder 
proposals began in the mid-1980s). 
 301. See Ryan, supra note 44, at 157-59 (1988) (reporting that institutional investors targeted 
around fifty corporations for shareholder proposals in 1987).  Church sponsored proposals 
accounted for 10.97% of all shareholder proposals in the 1979-80 proxy season and 14.02% of such 
proposals in 1982-83.  Liebeler, supra note 32, app. at tbl.2.  In the twenty-first century, pension 
funds such as the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS) have taken a leading 
role in the shareholder proposal movement.  Press Release, Ca. Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys., CalPERS Steps 
up Pace of Shareholder Activism, (Aug. 13, 2007), CALPERS.CA.GOV available at 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-2007/aug/steps-up-shareowner-
activism.xml (last visited Aug. 23. 2009).  In 2007, CalPERS alone filed thirty-three shareholder 
proposals.  Id.    Recently hedge funds have assumed a new prominence among proponents.  See 
Gillian & Starks, supra note 25, at 68 (describing hedge funds as a dominant force in the 
shareholder activism arena). 
 302. Letter from Peter C. Lovenhein to Terrence J. Fox, supra note 182. 
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drafter of shareholder proposals for non-profit organizations.303  He 
worked with People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), and 
helped them start an ongoing program aimed at bringing animal 
protection issues to the attention of corporations through shareholder 
proposals.304  Lovenheim also teamed up with Henry Spira, a brilliant 
tactician in the art of “constructive shaming,” which involves pressuring 
corporations into cooperating with advocates for the ethical treatment of 
animals.305  Spira’s biographer, Peter Singer, describes him as follows: 
Henry Spira [was] a bushy-haired New York high school teacher who 
spoke with a broad accent that came from years spent on ships as a 
sailor in the merchant marine and on the General Motors assembly line 
in New Jersey.  [Revlon’s vice president for investor relations, Roger] 
Shelley saw that Henry’s clothes were crumpled, that he rarely wore a 
tie, and that when he did, he seemed incapable of getting it to meet his 
collar. 
But that wasn’t all that Shelley noticed:  “There was not one ounce of 
product on his body that was produced by an animal, and that included 
his belt, that included shoes, that included everything . . . Here was a 
man who did what he said he would do.”306 
Singer chronicles Spira’s career as an advocate for animals.  From 
1975-1977, Spira organized a campaign to end animal experimentation 
at New York’s Museum of Natural History.307  Spira and his colleagues 
not only highlighted the suffering of the animals that were the subject of 
the experiments308 in the museum, they were also able to show that the 
research was more or less useless.309  The museum closed and 
dismantled its laboratories.310 
Spira next pressured Amnesty International into ceasing its support 
for a group of scientists that was torturing pigs in order to learn whether 
 
 303. See Peter Lovenheim, Stock in “Unsavory” Companies Is Potent Tool to Influence 
Option, NONPROFIT TIMES, Oct. 1, 1990, at 29 (describing Lovenheim as a New York based 
attorney who prepares and files shareholder proposals for nonprofits). 
 304. Tischler, supra note 13, at 43. 
 305. See generally PETER SINGER, ETHICS INTO ACTION:  HENRY SPIRA AND THE ANIMAL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1998). 
 306. Id. at x. 
 307. Id. at 54-74. 
 308. See id. at 66 (describing experiments on cats involving deafening, blinding, destruction of 
the sense of smell, removal of brain parts, severing of nerves in the penis and castration). 
 309. See id. at 67 (reporting that Science staff writer Nicholas Wade discovered that 14 of the 
21 scientific papers produced by the researchers had never been cited and the others were cited 
infrequently). 
 310. Id. at 71. 
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torture could be conducted without leaving visible traces.311  There 
followed a successful campaign to repeal New York’s Metcalf-Hatch 
Act, which allowed medical researchers to seize unclaimed dogs and 
cats from animal shelters.312  Spira then launched a series of campaigns 
against corporations engaged in inhumane treatment of animals, 
including:  a largely successful campaign to get Revlon to develop new 
ways to test eye irritancy and thus to stop blinding rabbits in order to test 
the safety of its products;313 a campaign that greatly reduced the use of a 
brutal product safety process, LD50, which involves determining the 
dose at which a substance is lethal to 50% of the animals tested;314 and a 
far less successful effort to expose inhumane treatment of chickens by 
the Perdue Farms corporation.315 
Spira next teamed up with Temple Grandin, a designer of livestock 
handling facilities and a Professor of Animal Science at Colorado State 
University, to replace the “shackle and hoist” method for the ritual 
slaughter of cattle with a more humane upright restraining system that 
Grandin designed.316  There followed an equally successful campaign to 
end the USDA’s policy of face-branding Mexican cattle.317  Aiming at a 
larger impact on the farm animal industry, Spira next targeted 
McDonald’s.318  Spira’s usual strategy was to use the threat of adverse 
publicity to bring corporations to the table.  He would send to 
corporations drafts of full-page ads destined for major newspapers.  The 
ads illustrated animal cruelty associated with the corporation's business.  
If the corporation did not agree to talk, the ads would appear.  With 
Lovenheim’s assistance, Spira supplemented that tactic with a 
shareholder proposal, calling on McDonald’s to form a committee to 
investigate the effect of factory farming on animals used in McDonald’s 
food products.319 
Together, Lovenheim and Spira were able to persuade McDonald’s 
to adopt three basic principles to help assure humane treatment of the 
 
 311. See id. at 75-77 (describing Spira’s victory in a short, cerebral campaign, which Spira 
celebrated by becoming a member of Amnesty International). 
 312. Id. at 78-83. 
 313. Id. at 86-111. 
 314. Id. at 114-29. 
 315. Id. at 142-49. 
 316. Id. at 156-60. 
 317. Id. at 161-64. 
 318. See id. at 166 (indicating that Spira’s aim was to get McDonald’s to give 0.01% “of its 
gross revenues to fund a research center dedicated to finding alternatives to stressful confinement of 
factory farming.”). 
 319. Tischler, supra note 13, at 43. 
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animals used in McDonald’s products.320  In the several years 
Lovenheim worked with Spira, he claims they never had to actually 
bring a proposal to a vote in a shareholder meeting.  Spira had won a 
reputation for openness to reasonable compromise.  He worked with 
corporations until they agreed to adopt measures that would enhance 
their reputations for corporate responsibility.  The result was almost 
invariably at least a partial adoption of the substance of the proposals 
that Spira and Lovenheim brought.321 
Lovenheim’s story thus suggests that shareholder proposals have 
consequences that go beyond their effects on the corporation to which 
the proposal originally relates.  Peter Lovenheim began as an amateur 
investor who chose to put a relatively small amount of money into 
corporations in which he believed.  He then learned that one of those 
corporations was engaged in a business practice of which he disapproved 
and which he considered inconsistent with the business model that had 
led him to invest in the first place.  He raised his voice, but both the 
corporation and the SEC would not hear his complaints.  This response 
turned Lovenheim into a litigant and, briefly, into an activist.  He shared 
his expertise in writing shareholder proposals with others who shared his 
political goals.  And one thing led to another.  For a time at least, Peter 
Lovenheim was transformed by his experience as a proponent into 
someone who worked with others to promote social change through 
mechanisms that were not limited to the shareholder proposal 
mechanism. 
IV.  SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP 
AND CONTROL 
Lovenheim322 and Medical Committee323 illustrate the 
determination and resolve required of any shareholder who wants to get 
a proposal before the shareholders of a corporation.  In both cases, the 
proponents of the proposal either represented or had the strong, active 
support of an organization.  Lovenheim was an attorney who was not 
intimidated by the procedural hurdles shareholders face.  As such, he 
was exceptional.  It is in fact very rare—and it was even rarer at the time 
of Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands—for disappointed proponents to 
 
 320. Id. at 43-44. 
 321. Telephone interview with Peter Lovenheim, supra note 162. 
 322. 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 323. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
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challenge no-action letters.324  Up until 1990, there were only thirteen 
reported cases reviewing SEC determinations on shareholder 
proposals.325  As the Medical Committee court noted, the SEC’s process 
for reviewing proposals was far from transparent and often resulted in 
corporations being permitted to omit proposals for reasons that were not 
effectively communicated to the proponents of those proposals.326 
For opponents of shareholder proposals, the fact that the proponent 
in Medical Committee was an organization that promoted social causes 
and that Lovenheim had close ties with such an organization highlights 
the problem of shareholder social proposals.  Opponents of shareholder 
proposals view shareholders primarily as passive investors seeking an 
economic return.327  So viewed, their only interest in political or social 
issues ought to be with the effect of such issues on the return on their 
investment in the corporation.  As one critic of the Rule put it:  
“Stockholder participatory democracy is a myth; investors do not buy 
stock in public companies with any serious expectation of influencing 
management.328  The Wall Street Rule is the only practical rule by 
which sensible investors are governed.  Small investors who do not like 
management sell their shares.”329  If the issue is essentially an economic 
one, say the social proposal skeptics, then it ought to be left for 
corporate managers to decide in the exercise of their business 
judgment.330  If the issue is not economic, then it has no business being 
before any corporate body. 
Lovenheim conceded that his proposal was likely to fail and that, 
even if it passed, it would require only that the corporation form a 
committee to study the methods used in the production of pâté de foie 
gras and to make recommendations for further distribution of the 
product in light of its findings.331  The Lovenheim court made clear that 
 
 324. Palmiter, supra note 44, at 881. 
 325. Id.  
 326. See Med. Comm., 432 F.2d at 674 (noting that “the shareholder often has no idea why his 
proposal was deemed unworthy or what he can do to cure its defects for subsequent proxy 
solicitations”). 
 327. Cane, supra note 16, at 61. 
 328. Liebeler, supra note 32, at 447. 
 329. Id. at 447.  Liebeler defines the Wall Street Rule as “the practice by investors unhappy 
with management of selling their shares in the market rather than trying to alter management’s 
behavior or the management team.”  Id. at 447 n.123. 
 330. See Cane, supra note 16, at 61 (noting that those who view shareholders as passive 
investors tend to think shareholder proposals ought to be permitted only when they relate to internal 
corporate governance issues or with issues that have a demonstrable economic effect on the 
corporation). 
 331. Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 561 (D.D.C. 1985). 
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the proposal’s poor prospects for success did not excuse the corporation 
from its obligation to distribute the proposal.332  It is hard to imagine 
why the SEC would have intended to permit corporate resources to be 
utilized in such a way.  And yet, in the two decades since Lovenheim 
was decided, neither Congress nor the SEC has taken action to reign in 
social proposals.  On the contrary, the SEC routinely cites to Lovenheim 
in denying no-action letters to corporations.333  This final section offers 
an explanation of why that is the case. 
A. The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Proposals 
In connection with its 1984 revisions to Rule 14a-8, the SEC 
circulated a questionnaire in order to gauge interested parties’ attitudes 
towards shareholder proposals.  Nearly three of four respondents agreed 
or strongly agreed that shareholder proposals are “a waste of 
management’s time and the corporation’s money.”334  Most respondents 
did not agree that proposals are an efficient or effective outlet for 
concerned shareholders, although the votes were more evenly split on 
whether the proposals are an “effective way of keeping management 
aware of shareholder concerns.”335 
Although corporation counsel tends to regard shareholder proposals 
as a nuisance,336 the overall costs associated with such proposals do not 
seem to be that significant.337  One scholar estimated the total cost at 
about $15 million/year as of 1992.338  In 1975-1976, AT&T estimated 
that it spent $112,450 in including five proposals in its proxy materials, 
while it spent $41,140 on eleven others that it omitted.339  A 1981 
 
 332. See id. (finding that Iroquois misstated the significance of the Rule, which the court 
viewed as guaranteeing shareholder access to proxy statements “whether or not their proposals are 
likely to pass and regardless of the immediate force of the resolution if enacted”). 
 333. See, e.g,. Raytheon Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 890011, at *7 (Mar. 30, 2009) 
(citing to Lovenheim, 618 F. Supp. 554  in denying corporation’s request for a no-action letter); 
Denny’s Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Denny’s Corporation, 2009 WL 772857, at *13 (March 17, 
2009). 
 334. See Cane, supra note 16, at 70 (reporting that 72.9% of respondents agreed that 
shareholder proposals are a waste of time and money). 
 335. See id. (reporting that while only 28.7% found proposals an efficient outlet for concerned 
shareholders and only 32% found proposals effective, 41% agreed that the proposals are effective 
for keeping management informed, with only 42.6% disagreeing with that statement). 
 336. See Chilgren, supra note 46, at 304 (outlining the course of a typical shareholder proposal 
from the corporation’s perspective and highlighting the expense to the corporation at each stage). 
 337. See id. at 305 (providing a conservative estimate of the cost to the corporation per 
proposal of “$1,700 of good hard cash.”). 
 338. Palmiter, supra note 44, at 883. 
 339. Liebeler, supra note 32, at 454. 
11- TELMAN_MACRO FINAL.DOCM 2/24/2012  9:59 AM 
334 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:291 
survey of eighteen major corporations indicated an average cost of 
$94,775 per proposal submitted.340  In the past two years, the SEC has 
responded to between 300 and 450 requests for no-action letters each 
year.341  Around the time of the Lovenheim case, the SEC reported that 
it devoted only 1,208 staff hours per year to the review of shareholder 
proposals and requests for no-action letters, a rough equivalent to the 
time of one full-time employee.342  And subsequent to that report the 
Rule was amended343 to require that proponents own significant amounts 
of stock for one year before submitting their proposal, thus eliminating 
the danger that proponents with no real interest in the corporation abuse 
the shareholder proposal mechanism in order to get their ideas before 
millions of investors at the corporation’s expense.344  Even the most 
determined opponents of the proposal concede that its costs both to 
corporations and to the SEC are not very significant.345 
As Lovenheim understood at the outset, shareholder proposals can 
succeed in affecting corporate policy even if they do not come close to 
winning the shareholder votes necessary for adoption.  They thus can be 
a highly effective way to persuade corporate management to adopt 
socially responsible positions.  From a policy perspective, the costs of 
shareholder proposals to the SEC and to corporations thus should be 
balanced against the possible benefits that derive from such proposals.  
The best evidence that such benefits exist is that numerous ideas for 
reform of corporate management originated in shareholder proposals but 
have been subsequently adopted and implemented by management.346  
 
 340. Id. 
 341. Division of Corporation Finance Shareholder Proposal No-Action Letters Issued Under 
Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-
8.shtml (last visited Aug. 29, 2009). 
 342. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 19,135, 47 Fed. Reg. 
47,420, 47,423 n.15 (Oct. 14, 1982). 
 343. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2010) (requiring that proponents own at least $2,000 worth 
of stock or 1% of the shares entitled to vote). 
 344. See Liebeler, supra note 32, at 425-26 (criticizing the rule for allowing proponents with 
only one share of stock to reach millions of investors while bearing little or none of the costs 
associated with the distribution of their proposals). 
 345. See Dent, supra note 32, at 15 (conceding that the SEC estimate of staff time spent 
dealing with shareholder proposals is “surprisingly low”); Liebeler, supra note 32, at 454 
(concluding that the costs are “not insignificant” but also are not “a substantial portion of the gross 
national product”). 
 346. See Palmiter, supra note 44, at 897-98 (citing:  Lewis Gilbert’s advocacy of more liberal 
dividend policies and consistent financial accounting:  shareholder proposals calling for 
compensation and nominating committee comprised solely of outside directors and improved 
mechanisms for disclosure of executive compensation; and the significant number of proposals that 
have been withdrawn after a negotiated settlement with management); but see Dent, supra note 32, 
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Because proponents benefit corporations and their fellow shareholders, 
SEC rules that force corporations to bear the costs of such proposals 
make sense.  Without them, because proponents of such proposals do not 
benefit in a manner that is proportionate to their contribution of time and 
effort,347 shareholders would not be adequately incentivized to bring 
potentially beneficial proposals.348  Viewed from this perspective, the 
Wall Street Rule is inefficient.  Proponents with ideas about how to 
improve corporations are a resource to the corporation.  If their main 
recourse is to invest elsewhere, the corporation’s resources are 
dissipated. 
One scholar has characterized the Rule as a tax imposed on 
corporations that pays for a useful mechanism of corporate 
governance.349  Corporations may well regard this “tax” as cheaper and 
less onerous than government regulation.350  Shareholder proposals 
facilitate communication between a corporation’s management and its 
owners in a manner that is more open, clear and specific than any other 
mechanism for communication between management and shareholders. 
B. The Efficacy of Shareholder Proposals 
Justifications for the existence of shareholder proposals relating to 
social issues come in two varieties.  One variety focuses on the nature of 
corporations.  It views shareholders not as passive investors but as 
owners who have—and should have—an interest in the social and 
political impact of a corporation.351  From this perspective, shareholders 
have not only a right but a duty to try to influence corporate 
management to adopt socially responsible policies.  In the years 
following the Medical Committee decision, scholars found ample 
evidence that corporations were adopting policies on social issues that 
were either directly or at least apparently stimulated by shareholder 
proposals.352 
 
at 19-22 (calling the effect of shareholder proposals infinitesimal and questioning the factual basis 
for claims that corporations actually respond to shareholder proposals). 
 347.  Palmiter, supra note 44, at 896 (noting that the proponent of a value-enhancing proposal 
will only benefit in proportion to her shareholdings). 
 348. See id. (summarizing collective action, free-riding and rational apathy problems that the 
rule requiring corporations to assume costs of shareholder proposals is meant to address). 
 349. See id. at 898 (“[T]he rule acts as a tax on public companies and their shareholders.”). 
 350. Id. at 899. 
 351. Cane, supra note 16, at 61. 
 352. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 22, at 642-43 (finding the Rule justified “by the major 
constructive impact it has had on actual corporate behavior” and citing “numerous instances” in 
which corporations have taken actions consistent with such proposals); see id. at 643-47 (describing 
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The other variety is Melvin Eisenberg’s safety valve theory; that is, 
the idea that shareholder proposals provide a useful safety valve in that 
they permit shareholders to raise their concerns before management and 
their fellow shareholders in a public forum in which the corporation’s 
leadership must provide some sort of response.353  As indicated above,354 
the safety valve comes at relatively low cost to the corporation.355 
But both varieties of defenses of the shareholder proposal process 
ultimately sound in a theory of the corporation that recognizes that 
corporations have a role in society that is too large to be reduced to 
economics.  Even those who continue to maintain that corporations exist 
“primarily to earn a profit for [their] shareholders,”356 acknowledge that 
the law now recognizes “a greatly enlarged social duty and responsibility 
of businesses” to care for the “comfort, health and well-being of their 
employees.”357  In fact, corporations’ social duty extends well beyond 
the well-being of their employees, and there is actually very little 
support, either in case law or in statutes, for the notion that corporations 
exist primarily for the benefit of their shareholders.358  Rather, corporate 
management is permitted to justify its decisions not only with reference 
to shareholder interests, but also with reference to the interests of other 
stakeholders, which may include the interests of creditors, employees, 
customers, and the industry as a whole or even the community at 
large.359 
The case that best illustrates this principle is Shlensky v. Wrigley,360 
in which minority owners in the corporation that owned the Chicago 
 
the impact of shareholder proposals in promoting:  divestment from South Africa; disclosure of 
affirmative action and equal opportunity employment programs; disclosure of compliance with Arab 
nations’ boycott of Israel; and various initiatives known collectively as “Campaign GM” and 
designed to promote more responsible corporate governance). 
 353. Id. at 635; Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 1494. 
 354. See supra text accompanying notes 323-31. 
 355. See Cane, supra note 16, at 57 (characterizing the cost of shareholder proposals to 
corporate management as “relatively slight”). 
 356. COX & HAZEN,  supra note 24, at 63; see also Dodge v. Ford Motor Corp., 170 N.W. 668, 
684 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders.”). 
 357. Id. at 66. 
 358. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VIRG. L. & BUS. REV. 
163, 172 (2008) (concluding that corporate charters, state corporation codes and case law provide 
no support for the notion that shareholder wealth maximization is a primary purpose of 
corporations). 
 359. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate 
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 579 n.1 (1992) (listing twenty-eight jurisdictions that 
permit corporate boards to consider the interests of constituencies other than shareholders). 
 360. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
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Cubs brought suit alleging that the corporation’s directors had breached 
their duty of care by refusing to install lights at Wrigley Field.361  The 
shareholders were armed with evidence that the introduction of night 
games would boost attendance at Cubs games, since they could show 
that the White Sox drew more fans at night games on days when the 
Cubs played day games, but the teams attracted roughly equal crowds 
when both played day games.362  The President of the corporation, 
Philip K. Wrigley,363 offered two reasons for refusing to install lights:  
his belief that baseball is a daytime sport; and his concern about the 
effect of lights and night baseball on the surrounding neighborhood.364  
The court permitted the corporation to place its commitment to certain 
ethical or aesthetic principles (“baseball is a daytime sport”) and to the 
Wrigleyville neighborhood ahead of the economic interests of its 
shareholders.365 
The law on corporate charitable giving is consistent with this 
expansive understanding of the purpose of corporations.  Corporations 
are permitted to make charitable donations without any sort of 
requirement that they justify those donations in economic terms.366  In 
the landmark case, A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court enthusiastically embraced the principle that corporations 
must supplement their wealth maximizing pursuits with a sense of their 
social and ethical responsibility to be good corporate citizens.367 
When the wealth of the nation was primarily in the hands of 
individuals they discharged their responsibilities as citizens by donating 
freely for charitable purposes.  With the transfer of most of the wealth to 
corporate hands and the imposition of heavy burdens of individual 
taxation, they have been unable to keep pace with increased 
philanthropic needs.  They have therefore, with justification, turned to 
corporations to assume the modern obligations of good citizenship in the 
same manner as humans do.368 
The court noted that its understanding of the need for corporate 
social responsibility was shared by Congress and state legislatures which 
 
 361. Id. at 777. 
 362. Id. at 778. 
 363. Id. at 777. 
 364. Id. at 778. 
 365. Id. 
 366. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 583 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1953) (permitting the 
corporation to make a charitable donation to Princeton University, in part because capitalism and 
free enterprise depend on the continued existence of private and independent universities). 
 367. Id. at 586. 
 368. Id. at 585-86. 
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had enacted statutes to encourage corporations to make charitable 
contributions.369  At the time Barlow was decided, twenty-nine states 
had passed statutes permitting corporations to make charitable 
contributions.370  The Model Business Corporations Act recognizes that 
corporations have the same power as an individual to do “all things 
necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs, including 
without limitation power:  . . . to make donations for the public welfare 
or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes.”371 
The Rule and the SEC’s permissive approach to social proposals 
are understandable in light of the broader doctrine of corporate purposes.  
Corporations do not exist primarily to maximize shareholder wealth.  
Corporations have become important and powerful legal persons.  Social 
norms, embodied in laws regulating corporate governance do not 
condone the sort of amoral conduct that would result if corporations 
were to conceive of themselves purely as vehicles for the production of 
wealth.  Moreover, in exercising their business judgment for the benefit 
of the corporations that they manage, corporate officers and directors do 
not want shareholder wealth maximization to define their decision-
making processes.  Enjoying as they do the benefits of deference to their 
business decisions that may be influenced by factors other than wealth-
maximization, corporate managers cannot deny shareholders the ability 
to contribute to the decision-making process through social proposals. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Judging by the few court cases that address social proposals, one 
could easily conclude that cases like Lovenheim are akin to nuisance 
suits that have no impact on corporate governance because the proposals 
never win anything approaching a majority of the shareholder vote.  
However, the cases themselves do not tell the full story behind social 
proposals.  While we cannot know for certain whether Peter 
Lovenheim’s proposal was the last straw that led Iroquois to discontinue 
its distribution of pâté de foie gras, it is clear from his subsequent 
 
 369. Id. at 586; see id. at 587 (citing language from 1950 New Jersey statute permitting 
corporate charitable donations not in excess of 1 percent of capital and surplus, unless authorized by 
shareholders, in order that “encouragement be given to the creation and maintenance of institutions 
engaged in community fund, hospital, charitable, philanthropic, educational, scientific or benevolent 
activities or patriotic or civic activities conducive to the betterment of social and economic 
conditions.”). 
 370. Id. at 587. 
 371. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02(13) (2003) (emphasis added). 
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experiences that social proposals can influence corporate decision-
making processes. 
But are social proposals desirable?  If U.S. citizens want 
regulations preventing the distribution of products that promote 
inhumane treatment of animals, if they want to outlaw cluster bombs, if 
they want universal health care for all citizens or residents, or if they 
want all corporations to embrace affirmative action and renounce all 
forms of discrimination based on gender, race, religion, national origin, 
sexual preference, or gender-identity, why is the political process 
inadequate?  Why should corporations foot the bill for the dissemination 
of all proposals relating to social issues of any significance that also 
have some sort of relation to the corporation’s business? 
As this Article has argued, the answer lies in the purpose of 
corporations.  Opponents of social proposals tend to view corporations 
as vehicles for the generation of wealth, and they view shareholders as 
passive investors concerned only with maximizing the return on their 
investment.372  This view of corporations appears to be too narrow.  
Both courts and legislatures permit corporate boards, in managing their 
corporations, to consider many factors other than shareholder wealth 
maximization.  The SEC’s and the courts’ permissive approach to social 
proposals is thus consistent with other bodies of law that recognize that, 
because of the increasingly important role of corporations as legal 
persons within our society, there is a general expectation that 
corporations will behave responsibly. 
While it is difficult to prove that shareholder proposals help them to 
do so, the cost to corporations and to society of social proposals is 
minimal.  The best evidence that their usefulness outweighs the costs 
associated with social proposals may be the failure of corporations to 
mobilize to oppose them.  Corporate managers may recognize the value 
of exchange with their shareholders on social issues, and they may also 
grudgingly appreciate the consciousness-raising effect that social 
proposals can have.  Iroquois Brands’ leadership may not have thought 
of itself as a corporation that catered to people committed to healthy 
lifestyles.  However, because of Peter Lovenheim’s proposal, it learned 
that it had a reputation for promoting food choices consistent with the 
humane treatment of animals.  That information was likely useful to the 
corporation, even if the process through which the corporation achieved 
enlightenment involved some pain and even some embarrassment. 
 
 
 372. See supra text accompanying notes 314-16. 

